We show the faithful embedding of common knowledge logic CKL into game logic GL, that is, CKL is embedded into GL and GL is a conservative extension of the fragment obtained by this embedding. Then many results in GL are available in CKL, and vice versa. For example, an epistemic consideration of Nash equilibrium for a game with pure strategies in GL is carried over to CKL. Another important application is to obtain a Gentzen-style sequent calculus formulation of CKL and its cut-elimination. The faithful embedding theorem is proved for the KD4–type propositional CKL and GL, but it holds for some variants of them.
We reformulate expected utility theory, from the viewpoint of bounded rationality, by introducing probability grids and a cognitive bound; we restrict permissible probabilities only to decimal ( $$\ell $$ -ary in general) fractions of finite depths up to a given cognitive bound. We distinguish between measurements of utilities from pure alternatives and their extensions to lotteries involving more risks. Our theory is constructive from the viewpoint of the decision maker. When a cognitive bound is small, the preference relation involves many incomparabilities, but these diminish as the cognitive bound is relaxed. Similarly, the EU hypothesis would hold more for a larger bound. The main part of the paper is a study of preferences including incomparabilities in cases with finite cognitive bounds; we give representation theorems in terms of a 2-dimensional vector-valued utility functions. We also exemplify the theory with one experimental result reported by Kahneman and Tversky.
We develop a series of small infinitary epistemic logics to study deductive inference involving intra-/interpersonal beliefs/knowledge such as common knowledge, common beliefs, and infinite regress of beliefs. Specifically, propositional epistemic logics GL (Lα) are presented for ordinalαup to a givenαo(αo≥ω) so that GL(L0) is finitary KDnwithnagents and GL(Lα) (α≥ 1) allows conjunctions of certain countably infinite formulae. GL(Lα) is small in that the language is countable and can be constructive. The set of formulaeLαis increasing up toα=ωbut stops atωWe present Kripke-completeness for GL(Lα) for eachα ≤ ω,which is proved using the Rasiowa–Sikorski lemma and Tanaka–Ono lemma. GL(Lα) has a sufficient expressive power to discuss intra-/interpersonal beliefs with infinite lengths. As applications, we discuss the explicit definability of Axioms T (truthfulness), 4 (positive introspection), 5 (negative introspection), and of common knowledge in GL(Lα) Also, we discuss the rationalizability concept in game theory in our framework. We evaluate where these discussions are done in the series GL(Lα),α ≤ ω.