COVID-19 has exposed the global supply chains to great vulnerability. In such extreme circumstances, product availability becomes a primary concern. This paper studies a basic inventory management strategy—lateral transshipment—under decentralized systems, which may play an important role in dealing with stockouts during unexpected crises. Lateral transshipments not only react quickly to stockout, but are also environmentally friendly due to the significant reduction of production and transportation pollution. This paper studies optimal lateral transshipment and replenishment decisions under a decentralized setting. We construct a multi-stage stochastic model that captures demand uncertainty and customer switching behavior. We demonstrate that, similar to the centralized setting, the optimal transshipment decision follows a double-threshold structure. The optimal replenishment quantities are determined under two pricing mechanisms—individual mechanism (IP) and negotiated mechanism (NP). Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the impact of lateral transshipment on supply chain cost reduction.

This paper examines remanufacturing decisions in the context of outsourcing, which have important implications for environmental and economic sustainability. Specifically, we model the competition between an experienced Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and an emerging Independent Remanufacturer (IR). The OEM can decide the manufacturing quantities of a brand-new product, and the IR can collect the OEM’s used products and remanufacture them for resale. The information structure is asymmetric, as only the OEM knows the market size. We identify the equilibrium quantities of both firms, which are shown to be strongly influenced by the IR’s cost efficiency and the consumers’ willingness to pay for the IR’s products. Asymmetric information also plays an important role. Is it always better to hide information? Interestingly, the OEM makes the most profit when the IR has full information on the market size. We find that when the market size is high, the OEM’s and IR’s production and encroachment decisions are the same as when both parties have equal information. The OEM also does not benefit from hiding market information from the IR when the market size is low. Indeed, if the IR’s cost efficiency is moderate and the market size is low, the OEM’s profits are actually hurt by hiding market information. Here, the diminished profits from hiding market information arises from the OEM’s substantially reduced production quantity to prevent IR encroachment. The OEM’s production quantity is higher if the OEM shares market information and the IR encroaches on the market. Thus, by sharing information, the OEM’s benefit gained from increased production quantity outweighs the cost of losing its monopoly. Additionally, consumer surplus increases when the IR engages in remanufacturing, while social surplus increases only when either the OEM’s or IR’s product is strongly favored. Even if the IR does not engage in remanufacturing, the resulting OEM monopoly can still lead to a higher environmental impact under certain market conditions. This arises when the OEM lowers production quantities when the IR encroaches on the market, thereby improving the overall environmental impact. Therefore, policymakers seeking to improve environmental and economic sustainability by encouraging IRs must consider these complex competition dynamics and consumer preferences, as they indirectly influence OEMs’ production decisions.

Counterfeiting is an important challenge in maintaining the security and sustainability of supply chains. This paper examines a supply chain consisting of a luxury goods manufacturer (and a retailer) in the presence of counterfeit goods. Inspired by the reality that both manufacturers and retailers have incentives to implement anti-counterfeiting, this paper combines the psychological impact of anti-counterfeiting efforts on consumers and discusses the impact of anti-counterfeiting efforts on pricing and profits. We find that: (1) anti-counterfeiting has a positive impact on the selling price of brand products and the firms’ profits. However, the impact on wholesale prices varies depending on who implements the anti-counterfeiting strategy. (2) Only when the quality of brand products is higher than the threshold, is the firm willing to input anti-counterfeiting efforts. Manufacturers in a reselling structure are more motivated to fight counterfeits. (3) Implementing anti-counterfeiting in a direct selling structure is the most effective strategy for manufacturers. Under a reselling structure, it is more beneficial for manufacturers to have the retailer input anti-counterfeiting efforts. Our study provides insights into the reasons why some manufacturers establish internal anti-counterfeiting teams under the direct selling structure, while others incentivize retailers to invest in anti-counterfeiting.