This paper studied the impact of education investment on regional poverty alleviation of Yunnan’s poor counties, especially the dynamic constraints and marginal benefits of education input. This paper takes 30 poor counties in Yunnan province from 2007 to 2020 as the research object. A double fixed effect model, a systematic GMM model, and a quantile regression model are used to study the effect of education investment on regional poverty alleviation from static and dynamic levels. The results show that education investment has a significant positive effect on regional poverty alleviation at both static and dynamic levels. At the same time, under different poverty levels, the effect of education investment on poverty alleviation shows a law of diminishing marginal effect. As for the current situation of poor counties in Yunnan Province, the effect of education investment on poverty alleviation is increasing at a decreasing rate. The research object of this paper has achieved the goal of getting rid of absolute poverty, so the conclusion of this paper has more reference value.

This paper aims to compare the educational attainment of a conflict region (the Deep South) and a non-conflict region (the rest of the South) of Thailand using the Socio-Economic Survey, 2015. This paper employs the Instrumental Variable approach and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in an intergenerational regression model. When controlling parental schooling, household income and size, religion, and gender, the results show that children from the Deep South obtain almost one year less schooling than children from the rest of the Southern region. Interestingly, Muslims are ahead in terms of educational attainment when compared to non-Muslims in the non-conflict region, but not in the conflict region. Females outperform males in both regions, but the coefficient of female dummy is higher in the non-conflict region. Moreover, the rate of intergenerational transmission of educational attainment is higher in the Deep South compared to that in the rest of the southern region, which may lead to long-term educational inequality in the Deep South region. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition confirms that the 40% schooling gap between these two regions is unexplained but might be due to the chronic social unrest. The findings of this paper show that customized educational reforms and policies to resolve the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand should be employed.

Purpose: This paper aims to find the effects of mothers’ schooling on child schooling.Design/methodology/approach: This paper uses Bangladesh's Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), which is a nationally representative survey. It employs the instrumental variable technique to estimate the intergenerational model.Findings: Interestingly, the results show that the intergenerational transmission of schooling from mothers is slightly higher than that of fathers in Bangladesh.Research limitations/implications: Estimating the intergenerational model is challenging due to the endogeneity issue. The methodology used in this paper may help to find similar evidence from other countries.Practical implications: The findings of the study may help to design and evaluate the educational policies in Bangladesh or a country like Bangladesh. For instance, the results of this paper suggest that the female stipend program (FSP) in Bangladesh is effective for the next generation’s schooling.Originality/value: This paper is among the first to analyze the effect of mother’s schooling on the child’s schooling, controlling the father’s education and other household characteristics. In addition, it controls for endogeneity bias due to genetic transmission.Peer review: The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-06-2023-0491

Self-control problems affect consumption, saving, and labor supply, with implications for tax policy. We study optimal taxation with the self-control preferences of Gul and Pesendorfer. Krusell et al. showed that with these preferences, savings should be subsidized; under logarithmic utility, they showed that the subsidy should rise with age. We extend their analysis by adding a labor–leisure choice and comparing investment, capital income, consumption, and labor income taxes. When temptation applies to the consumption–leisure bundle, a single investment or capital income subsidy corrects both the consumption and the leisure margins in partial equilibrium, whereas consumption taxes require a matching labor tax adjustment. Non-separability between consumption and leisure does not change this requirement. With inelastic labor, the same subsidy rates implement the commitment allocation in a two-period general equilibrium model. In a logarithmic T-period partial equilibrium model with elastic labor, the same subsidy formulas and age profile hold under an interior menu condition. In a calibrated example with annual periods, implementing the commitment allocation raises welfare by about 7 percent of consumption in the baseline. The gain varies widely across empirically plausible degrees of present bias.