Jerald Kralik

Jerald Kralik


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2011 in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
EXEric R. Xu
Eric R. Xu
EKEmily J. Knight
Emily J. Knight
JKJerald Kralik
Jerald Kralik
In humans, the order of receiving sequential rewards can significantly influence the overall subjective utility of an outcome. For example, people subjectively rate receiving a large reward by itself significantly higher than receiving the same large reward followed by a smaller one (Do, Rupert, & Wolford, 2008). This result is called the peak-end effect. A comparative analysis of order effects can help determine the generality of such effects across primates, and we therefore examined the influence of reward-quality order on decision making in three rhesus macaque monkeys ( Macaca mulatta). When given the choice between a high–low reward sequence and a low–high sequence, all three monkeys preferred receiving the high-value reward first. Follow-up experiments showed that for two of the three monkeys their choices depended specifically on reward-quality order and could not be accounted for by delay discounting. These results provide evidence for the influence of outcome order on decision making in rhesus monkeys. Unlike humans, who usually discount choices when a low-value reward comes last, rhesus monkeys show no such peak-end effect.

1 December 2016 in Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MKMayuka Kowaguchi
Mayuka Kowaguchi
NPNirali P. Patel
Nirali P. Patel
MBMegan E. Bunnell
Megan E. Bunnell
JKJerald Kralik
Jerald Kralik

6 July 2022 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JLJeungmin Lee
Jeungmin Lee
JKJerald Kralik
Jerald Kralik
JKJaehyung Kwon
Jaehyung Kwon
JJJaeseung Jeong
Jaeseung Jeong
To understand, predict, and help correct each other’s actions we need to maintain accurate, up-to-date knowledge of people, and communication is a critical means by which we gather and disseminate this information. Yet the conditions under which we communication social information remain unclear. Testing hypotheses generated from our theoretical framework, we examined when and why social information is disseminated about an absent third party: i.e., gossiped. Gossip scenarios presented to participants (e.g., “Person-X cheated on their exam”) were based on three key factors: (1) target (ingroup, outgroup, or celebrity), (2) valence (positive or negative), and (3) content. We then asked them (a) whether they would spread the information, and (b) to rate it according to subjective valence, ordinariness, interest level, and emotion. For ratings, the scenarios participants chose to gossip were considered to have higher valence (whether positive or negative), to be rarer, more interesting, and more emotionally evocative; thus showing that the paradigm was meaningful to subjects. Indeed, for target, valence, and content, a repeated-measures ANOVA found significant effects for each factor independently, as well as their interactions. The results supported our hypotheses: e.g., for target, more gossiping about celebrities and ingroup members (over strangers); for valence, more about negative events overall, and yet for ingroup members, more positive gossiping; for content, more about moral topics, with yet all domains of social content communicated depending on the situation—context matters, influencing needs. The findings suggest that social knowledge sharing (i.e., gossip) involves sophisticated calculations that require our highest sociocognitive abilities, and provide specific hypotheses for future examination of neural mechanisms.

1 July 2018 in Cognition
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WSWilliam W.L. Sampson
William W.L. Sampson
SKSara A. Khan
Sara A. Khan
ENEric J. Nisenbaum
Eric J. Nisenbaum
JKJerald Kralik
Jerald Kralik

1 December 2009
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
MSMichael Z. Sauter
Michael Z. Sauter
DSDongqing Shi
Dongqing Shi
JKJerald Kralik
Jerald Kralik
The use of multi-agent reinforcement learning is growing because of it's ability to scale in complexity and its lack of need for knowledge of the state and other agents. Chimpanzee hunting behavior is a suitable complex and interesting model for which multi-agent reinforcement learning is appropriate. Chimpanzee hunting strategies vary in both use and complexity and ultimately depend on the environment for which they are applied. Learning to use the varying strategies and learning when they are most effective is what this paper addresses and provides initial results and framework to build upon.

11 September 2020 in Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SLSewoong Lim
Sewoong Lim
SYSangsup Yoon
Sangsup Yoon
JKJaehyung Kwon
Jaehyung Kwon
JKJerald Kralik
Jerald Kralik
JJJaeseung Jeong
Jaeseung Jeong
Humans organize sequences of events into a single overall experience, and evaluate the aggregated experience as a whole, such as a generally pleasant dinner, movie, or trip. However, such evaluations are potentially computationally taxing, and so our brains must employ heuristics (i.e., approximations). For example, the peak-end rule hypothesis suggests that we average the peaks and end of a sequential event vs. integrating every moment. However, there is no general model to test viable hypotheses quantitatively. Here, we propose a general model and test among multiple specific ones, while also examining the role of working memory. The models were tested with a novel picture-rating task. We first compared averaging across entire sequences vs. the peak-end heuristic. Correlation tests indicated that averaging prevailed, with peak and end both still having significant prediction power. Given this, we developed generalized order-dependent and relative-preference-dependent models to subsume averaging, peak and end. The combined model improved the prediction power. However, based on limitations of relative-preference—including imposing a potentially arbitrary ranking among preferences—we introduced an absolute-preference-dependent model, which successfully explained the remembered utilities. Yet, because using all experiences in a sequence requires too much memory as real-world settings scale, we then tested “windowed” models, i.e., evaluation within a specified window. The windowed (absolute) preference-dependent (WP) model explained the empirical data with long sequences better than without windowing. However, because fixed-windowed models harbor their own limitations—including an inability to capture peak-event influences beyond a fixed window—we then developed discounting models. With (absolute) preference-dependence added to the discounting rate, the results showed that the discounting model reflected the actual working memory of the participants, and that the preference-dependent discounting (PD) model described different features from the WP model. Taken together, we propose a combined WP-PD model as a means by which people evaluate experiences, suggesting preference-dependent working-memory as a significant factor underlying our evaluations.