Jessecae Marsh

Dr. Jessecae Marsh

Department of Psychology, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015, USA
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

25Years (2002-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 June 2018 in European Journal of Social Psychology
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Journal Article
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JVJoseph A. Vitriol
Joseph A. Vitriol
JMJessecae Marsh
Jessecae Marsh

1 September 2006 in Psychological Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
WAWoo-Kyoung Ahn
Woo-Kyoung Ahn
EFElizabeth H. Flanagan
Elizabeth H. Flanagan
JMJessecae Marsh
Jessecae Marsh
CSCharles A. Sanislow
Charles A. Sanislow

1 January 2002 in Memory & Cognition
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Journal Article
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WAWoo-Kyoung Ahn
Woo-Kyoung Ahn
JMJessecae Marsh
Jessecae Marsh
CLChristian C. Luhmann
Christian C. Luhmann
KLKevin Lee
Kevin Lee

13 February 2020 in Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications
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MZMin Zheng
Min Zheng
JMJessecae Marsh
Jessecae Marsh
JNJeffrey V. Nickerson
Jeffrey V. Nickerson
SKSamantha Kleinberg
Samantha Kleinberg
Background: Causality is inherently linked to decision-making, as causes let us better predict the future and intervene to change it by showing which variables have the capacity to affect others. Recent advances in machine learning have made it possible to learn causal models from observational data. While these models have the potential to aid human decisions, it is not yet known whether the output of these algorithms improves decision-making. That is, causal inference methods have been evaluated on their accuracy at uncovering ground truth, but not the utility of such output for human consumption. Simply presenting more information to people may not have the intended effects, particularly when they must combine this information with their existing knowledge and beliefs. While psychological studies have shown that causal models can be used to choose interventions and predict outcomes, that work has not tested structures of the complexity found in machine learning, or how such information is interpreted in the context of existing knowledge.Results: Through experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, we study how people use causal information to make everyday decisions about diet, health, and personal finance. Our first experiment, using decisions about maintaining bodyweight, shows that causal information can actually lead to worse decisions than no information at all. In Experiment 2, we test decisions about diabetes management, where some participants have personal domain experience and others do not. We find that individuals without such experience are aided by causal information, while individuals with experience do worse. Finally, our last two experiments probe how prior experience interacts with causal information. We find that while causal information reduces confidence in individuals with prior experience, it has the opposite effect on those without experience. In Experiment 4 we show that our results are not due to an inability to use causal models, and that they may be due to familiarity with a domain rather than actual knowledge.Conclusion: While causal inference can potentially lead to more informed decisions, we find that more work is needed to make causal models useful for the types of decisions found in daily life.

1 April 2006 in Memory & Cognition
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Journal Article
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JMJessecae Marsh
Jessecae Marsh
WAWoo-Kyoung Ahn
Woo-Kyoung Ahn
Dennis and Ahn (2001) found that during contingency learning, initial evidence influences causal judgments more than does later evidence (a primacy effect), whereas López, Shanks, Almaraz, and Fernández (1998) found the opposite (a recency effect). We propose that in contingency learning, people use initial evidence to develop an anchoring hypothesis that tends to be underadjusted by later evidence, resulting in a primacy effect. Thus, factors interfering with initial hypothesis development, such as simultaneously learning too many contingencies, as in López et al., would reduce the primacy effect. Experiment 1 showed a primacy effect with learning contingencies involving only one outcome but no primacy effect with two outcomes. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the magnitude of the primacy effect correlated with participants' verbal working memory capacity. It is concluded that a critical moderator for exhibition of the primacy effect is task complexity, presumably because it interferes with initial hypothesis development.

1 March 2009 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
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Journal Article
Closed access
JMJessecae Marsh
Jessecae Marsh
WAWoo-Kyoung Ahn
Woo-Kyoung Ahn
Existing models of causal induction primarily rely on the contingency between the presence and the absence of a causal candidate and an effect. Yet, classification of observations into these four types of covariation data may not be straightforward because (a) most causal candidates, in real life, are continuous with ambiguous, intermediate values and because (b) effects may unfold after some temporal lag, providing ambiguous contingency information. Although past studies suggested various reasons why ambiguous information may not be used during causal induction, the authors examined whether learners spontaneously use ambiguous information through a process called causal assimilation. In particular, the authors examined whether learners willingly place ambiguous observations into one of the categories relevant to the causal hypothesis, in accordance with their current causal beliefs. In Experiment 1, people's frequency estimates of contingency data reflected that information ambiguous along a continuous quantity dimension was spontaneously categorized and assimilated in a causal induction task. This assimilation process was moderated by the strength of the upheld causal hypothesis (Experiment 2), could alter the overall perception of a causal relationship (Experiment 3), and could occur over temporal sequences (Experiment 4).