We study the mechanisms through which macroeconomic level shocks, namely macro easing and industry curbing policies from the government and housing preference shock from the households, exert their impact on the real estate and manufacturer sectors in China. Our analysis shows that whilst the macro easing monetary policy stimulates overall investment in the two sectors, it also causes the crowding out effect, inducing the capital flow disproportionally to the real estate industry. In this sense, it resembles the positive housing preference shock by contributing to the imbalance between housing and real industry. Meanwhile, policies aimed at curbing real estate boom have a leakage effect, which can offset the crowding out effect from the housing preference and easing monetary policy shocks. Both crowding out and leakage effects stem from the heterogeneous characteristics of durable and non-durable goods produced by real estate and manufacture sectors, respectively, instead of from heterogeneous borrowing constraints. Our results add to the understanding of transmission mechanisms of different policies on production sectors and provide insights for policy makers on how to effectively apply policies to affect the economy in a macro-prudential way.
29 July 2026 in Frontiers in Environmental Science
We quantify the extensive margin of environmental policy—the component of aggregate emissions driven by changes in the number of active firms—in a New Keynesian E-DSGE model with endogenous firm entry, nominal rigidities, and a stock pollutant, estimated on Chinese quarterly data. Decomposing the aggregate response into a per-firm (intensive) margin and a firm-count (extensive) margin, we find the extensive margin contributes about 6 percent of the cumulative emission reduction under an emission tax but about 71 percent under an abatement subsidy—its importance rises with the transience of the policy’s per-firm effect. For an abatement subsidy the extensive margin works in the same direction as the intensive margin: by depressing firm entry it reinforces the per-firm reduction, so omitting the firm-count term would miss a large share of the cumulative response. Because the subsidy is transitory, however, the induced abatement is gradually unwound and the aggregate reduction is concentrated in the first few quarters. Consumption-equivalent welfare comparisons rank the emission tax as the preferred marginal instrument in the presence of a stock-pollutant externality.