This article is an attempt to qualify existing evidence that increasing diversity is detrimental to a vibrant civil society. We focus specifically on immigration-generated diversity, and argue that while it may have negative effects on some specific civic and political outcomes in some contexts, these effects vary widely across advanced democracies. Our argument rests on analysis of a cross-national, cross-sectional time-series dataset that brings together individual-level World Values Survey data with country-level variables. With these data, we track within-country changes over time in trust and engagement. We show that immigration can have a negative effect on social trust, organizational membership and political engagement, but that institutional arrangements shape this relationship in systematic ways. In more economically equal societies and in more multicultural countries (where cultural minorities are recognized and accommodated), the negative effects of immigration on trust and engagement are mitigated or even reversed. We conclude that there is no general link between immigration-generated diversity and collective-mindedness. Rather, the direction and strength of the relationship depend on institutional and policy contexts.Résumé.Cet article vise à nuancer les preuves existantes que la diversité croissante porte préjudice à une société civile dynamique. Nous nous concentrons particulièrement sur la diversité produite par l'immigration. Nous soutenons que même si elle peut exercer une influence négative sur quelques indices dans certains contextes, ces effets varient considérablement selon le pays examiné parmi les démocraties avancées. Notre argument repose sur l'analyse d'un ensemble de données multinational, transversal et longitudinal qui rassemble des données au niveau individuel duWorld Values Surveyavec des variables au niveau des pays. Au moyen de ces données, nous examinons les changements survenus à l'intérieur des pays, au fil du temps, sur le plan de la confiance et de l'engagement. Nous montrons que l'immigration peut avoir un effet négatif sur la confiance sociale, l'adhésion à des organisations et l'engagement politique, mais que les arrangements institutionnels influencent cette relation de manières systématiques. Dans les sociétés plus économiquement égales et dans les pays plus multiculturels (où les minorités culturelles sont reconnues et accommodées), les effets négatifs de l'immigration sur la confiance et l'engagement sont atténués, voire inversés. Nous concluons qu'il n'y a aucun lien général entre la diversité produite par l'immigration et l'esprit collectif. La direction et la force de la relation entre les deux dépendent plutôt des politiques et des contextes institutionnels.
I examine patterns of joblessness among immigrant men and women from 33 countries of origin now living in Britain, Germany and Sweden. Access to welfare, access to the labor market, job segregation and institutional support for women's employment define distinct policy configurations in these three destinations. Findings show that gaps in joblessness between immigrants and the native-born are larger in Sweden than in Britain and Germany, net of human capital, socio-demographic characteristics and sending country. However, long-settled immigrants have more similar outcomes across the three countries than recent newcomers. Also, immigrant women in Sweden work at higher absolute rates than immigrant women elsewhere. This suggests that gendered employment policies in destination countries are a crucial dimension of immigrant economic incorporation. Ultimately, such policies also shape the fiscal impact of immigration.
This article examines immigrant poverty across three institutionally distinct European states: Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Focusing on 33 immigrant groups and controlling for sending country in addition to human capital and family characteristics, the analysis explores host country variation in (1) immigrant/native-born poverty gaps and (2) the underlying poverty levels at which these gaps occur. Findings reveal the largest poverty gaps in Sweden and demonstrate that this is due to immigrants’ comparatively severe labor market disadvantages. However, underlying poverty levels are also lowest in Sweden because of a two-pronged policy strategy of enabling work (particularly among women, immigrant and native-born alike) and reducing poverty through income support. Thus, immigrants in Sweden live at lower levels of poverty than their immigrant counterparts elsewhere, despite facing higher levels of inequality vis-à-vis native-born Swedes. The conclusion considers implications of poverty gaps and poverty levels, especially for the children of immigrants.
Theories of immigrant integration and political-economic institutions starkly contrast the contemporary labour markets of France and the United Kingdom (UK). We draw out predictions from these theories and then, using Labour Force Surveys that we harmonize ourselves, we empirically examine inequalities that immigrants of disadvantaged minority origins face in labour force participation, employment, and earnings in the two societies. The UK labour market attracts immigrants who have a larger skills advantage over natives. Nevertheless, we find inequalities of strikingly similar magnitude in the two labour markets. In the UK, barriers to labour force participation are paramount, whereas in France, barriers to employment among active job-seekers are more important. Earnings inequalities are less significant in both countries. Overall, we conclude that barriers to opportunity are largely similar in the two countries for immigrants of disadvantaged minority origins.