We design a mechanism of the players’ sustainable cooperation in multistage n-person game in the extensive form with chance moves. When the players agreed to cooperate in a dynamic game they have to ensure time consistency of the long-term cooperative agreement. We provide the players’ rank based (PRB) algorithm for choosing a unique cooperative strategy profile and prove that corresponding optimal bundle of cooperative strategies satisfies time consistency, that is, at every subgame along the optimal game evolution a part of each original cooperative trajectory belongs to the subgame optimal bundle. We propose a refinement of the backwards induction procedure based on the players’ attitude vectors to find a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and use this algorithm to calculate a characteristic function. Finally, to ensure the sustainability of the cooperative agreement in a multistage game we employ the imputation distribution procedure (IDP) based approach, that is, we design an appropriate payment schedule to redistribute each player’s optimal payoff along the optimal bundle of cooperative trajectories. We extend the subgame consistency notion to extensive-form games with chance moves and prove that incremental IDP satisfies subgame consistency, subgame efficiency and balance condition. An example of a 3-person multistage game is provided to illustrate the proposed cooperation mechanism.
We study a multi-objective finite-horizon game model of renewable, common resource extraction where the players have two separate objectives (one is economic success; the other describes the players’ environmental concern). We derive the cooperative strategy and the subgame-perfect Pareto equilibrium in linear-state non-stationary feedback strategies by employing the dynamic programming approach. Since the utility is transferable only based on the economic criterion, we need to revise the concept of time consistency and the payoff-distribution procedure to provide a mechanism for sustainable long-term cooperation. All the results are illustrated with a numerical example.
We understand a solution of a cooperative TU-game as the α-prenucleoli set, α ∈ R, which is a generalization of the notion of the [0, 1]-prenucleolus. We show that the set of all α-nucleoli takes into account the constructive power with the weight α and the blocking power with the weight (1 − α) for all possible values of the parameter α. The further generalization of the solution by introducing two independent parameters makes no sense. We prove that the set of all α-prenucleoli satisfies properties of duality and independence with respect to the excess arrangement. For the considered solution we extend the covariance propertywith respect to strategically equivalent transformations.