This paper explores the problem of protection against false data injection attacks on the power system state estimation. Although many research works have been reported previously to solve the same problem, yet most of them are only for perfect false data injection attacks. To address the problem reasonably, all related factors influencing the success probability and corresponding attack impact of imperfect false data injection attacks should also be considered. Based on such considerations, a TOTAL (TOpology, parameTer, Accuracy, Level) protection strategy considering all corresponding factors is proposed. The TOTAL protection strategy minimizes the attack impact of typical imperfect false data injection attacks (single measurement attacks) while defending against typical perfect false data injection attacks (single state variable attacks). Depending on whether the protection scheme contains Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), we formulate the meter selection as a linear binary programming or integer programming problem, which can be solved by suitable solvers. The proposed strategy is compared with existing methods in the literature and evaluated using standard IEEE test cases.
16 June 2020 in IEEE Wireless Communications Letters
Deep neural networks have been applied to many tasks in air traffic management, ranging from anomaly detection to flight trajectory prediction. However, it has been shown that such algorithms are susceptible to adversarial examples. In this paper, we manage to show that current deep learning algorithms proposed for spoofing detection are vulnerable to maliciously crafted ADS-B data. To inject the false messages into the ADS-B system without being detected, we need to find adversarial perturbations to balance the need of overwhelming the channel noise and keeping the decoding error low. Simulation results demonstrate the viability of our approach to evade the DNN-based spoofing detector without increasing the decoding error.
3 March 2019 in Security and Communication Networks
Location verification is a promising approach among various ADS-B security mechanisms, which can monitor announced positions in ADS-B messages with estimated positions. Based on common assumption that the attacker is equipped with only a single device, this mechanism can estimate the position state through analysis of time measurements of messages using multilateration algorithm. In this paper, we propose the formal model of multidevice false data injection attacks in the ATC system against the location verification. Assuming that attackers equipped with multiple devices can manipulate the ADS-B messages in distributed receivers without any mutual interference, such attacker can efficiently construct attack vectors to change the results of multilateration. The feasibility of a multidevice false data injection attack is demonstrated experimentally. Compared with previous multidevice attacks, the multidevice false data injection attacks can offer lower cost and more covert attacks. The simulation results show that the proposed attack can reduce the attackers’ cost by half and achieve better time synchronization to bypass the existing anomaly detection. Finally, we discuss the real-world constraints that limit their effectiveness and the countermeasures of these attacks.
Coverage-guided grey-box fuzzing for computer systems has been explored for decades. However, existing techniques do not adequately explore the space of continuous behaviors in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), which may miss safety-critical bugs. Optimization-guided falsification is promising to find violations of safety specifications, but not suitable for identifying traditional program bugs. This article presents a fuzzing process for finding safety violations at the development phase, which is guided by two quantities: a branch coverage metric to explore discrete program behaviors and a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) robust satisfaction metric to identify undesirable continuous plant behaviors. We implement CPFuzz to demonstrate the utility of the idea and estimate its effectiveness on seven control system benchmarks. The results show up to a better performance in average time to find violations on all benchmarks than S-TaLiRo and six benchmarks than S3CAMX. Finally, we exploit CPFuzz to synthesize the sensor spoofing attack on a DC motor with fixed-point overflow vulnerability as a case study.