Keith Taylor

Dr. Keith Taylor

Human Ecology, University of California, Davis, Davis, California, USA
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
17 December 2021 in Review of Policy Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PKParisa Kavousi
Parisa Kavousi
TGTaylor Giamo
Taylor Giamo
GAGwen Arnold
Gwen Arnold
MAMateo Alliende
Mateo Alliende
EHElisabeth Huynh
Elisabeth Huynh
KTKeith Taylor
Keith Taylor
This review article assays the scholarly and popular press literature on the opportunities and challenges the growing legalized cannabis industry offers U.S. local governments and communities. Localities are an important focus because in many states with legalized cannabis, local jurisdictions have authority to prevent or condition its cultivation, sale, and use. Opportunities potentially flowing to localities from legalization include increased tax revenues and land values, business expansion, and increased employment; public health and safety benefits; and the potential for legalization to advance social and racial inclusion. Challenges include the possibility that economic benefits will be more limited than anticipated; complex regulatory environments facing local governments and cannabis businesses, possible increases in pollution, blight, and public health and safety concerns; and less advancement of social and racial equity than hoped by advocates. We offer recommendations for scholars investigating cannabis governance concerns and practitioners directly grappling with them.

14 August 2015 in Administrative Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KTKeith Taylor
Keith Taylor
Third sector organizations are oftentimes seen as contributing to a robust civil society. Yet the dominant modes of third sector organizational governance often adhere to a unitary orientation. The over-reliance on unitary modes of governance introduces two challenges: first, organizational stakeholders are kept from utilizing participatory mechanisms that would enable them to act as societal intermediaries, and; second, these organizations may underperform due to the artificial separation of stakeholders from participating in governance. This paper addresses calls to widen our knowledge by translating theory into practice through a discussion about the efficacy of pluralistic governance. The co-operative enterprise in introduced to focus analyses on pluralist modes of stakeholder governance. A specific co-operative’s governance structure and practice is introduced—Choctaw Electric Co-operative—through an archival analyses of secondary media accounts of a stakeholder-led reform initiative in rural Oklahoma. The Ostrom Design Principles—a diagnostic used to assess institutional robustness—are applied to demonstrate the shortsightedness of unitary governance, and highlight the potential benefits of pluralistic stakeholder engagement. Knowledge is widened in two ways: first, empirical analyses of co-operative enterprise may provide for significant insights and innovations in third sector governance, and; second proper systems of pluralistic governance exhibit enormous capacity to better orient the firm toward better serving the stakeholder base, improving performance and institutional robustness, while empowering stakeholders as societal intermediaries.

22 April 2023 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
IMIlia Murtazashvili
Ilia Murtazashvili
Veeshan RayamajheeVeeshan Rayamajhee
Veeshan Rayamajhee
KTKeith Taylor
Keith Taylor
Nurdles have been referred to by some as a global environmental disaster. However, relative to the controversies surrounding industrial fracking practices, such as public health and safety associated with extraction of shale gas (as well as shale oil), the problems with nurdles are not as widely known. In this article, we highlight that fracking and nurdles are interrelated: fracking processes are a major source of the raw materials used to produce nurdles, which are tiny plastic pellets polluting our waters. Our contention is that a key question for analysis of fracking is how to regulate the externalities associated with downstream products produced in the fracking process. This article takes insights from Elinor Ostrom and scholars of the Bloomington School of Political Economy—such as polycentricity, diversity of collective action problems (CAPs), coproduction, and institutional diversity—to analyze nurdles pollution as a global commons problem. Nurdles generate widespread, large-scale negative externalities that are difficult to contain and address within a fixed geographical boundary governed by a static jurisdictional authority. Using the case of the Royal Dutch Shell cracker plant in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, we show that nurdles present complex and nested challenges that require coproduction, with citizen monitoring playing an essential role in mitigating negative externalities. We demonstrate the efficacy of applying polycentric approaches toward addressing CAPs associated with nurdles.


14 December 2021 in Agricultural Finance Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZPZoë Plakias
Zoë Plakias
MJMargaret Jodlowski
Margaret Jodlowski
TGTaylor Giamo
Taylor Giamo
PKParisa Kavousi
Parisa Kavousi
KTKeith Taylor
Keith Taylor
Purpose: Despite 2016 legalization of recreational cannabis cultivation and sale in California with the passage of Proposition 64, many cannabis businesses operate without licenses. Furthermore, federal regulations disincentivize financial institutions from banking and lending to licensed cannabis businesses. The authors explore the impact of legal cannabis business activity on California financial institutions, the barriers to banking faced by cannabis businesses, and the nontraditional sources of financing used by the industry.Design/methodology/approach: The authors use a mixed methods approach. The authors utilize call data for banks and credit unions headquartered in California and state cannabis licensing data to estimate the impact of the extensive and intensive margins of licensed cannabis activity on key banking indicators using difference-and-difference and fixed effects regressions. The qualitative data come from interviews with industry stakeholders in northern California's “Emerald Triangle” and add important context.Findings: The quantitative results show economically and statistically significant impacts of licensed cannabis activity on banking indicators, suggesting both direct and spillover effects from cannabis activity to the financial sector. However, cannabis businesses report substantial barriers to accessing basic financial services and credit, leading to nontraditional financing arrangements.Practical implications: The results suggest opportunities for cannabis businesses and financial institutions if regulations are eased and important avenues for further study.Originality/value: The authors contribute to the nascent literature on cannabis economics and the literature on banking regulation and nontraditional finance.

1 September 2023 in Public Administration Quarterly
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KTKeith Taylor
Keith Taylor
NGNathan Goodman
Nathan Goodman
PKParisa Kavousi
Parisa Kavousi
TGTaylor Giamo
Taylor Giamo
GAGwen Arnold
Gwen Arnold
ZPZoë Plakias
Zoë Plakias
The 2016 passage of California's Proposition 64, legalizing recreational (adult-use) cannabis, was justified ex ante in part for its potential to encourage restorative justice and positive local and state economic outcomes. But are the local institutions administering Proposition 64 achieving these aims? We address this question via a two-year case study of Mendocino County's polycentric cannabis governance system using a mixed methods approach including archival analysis, cannabis industry and governance system interviews, and participant observation. Evidence from our case study suggests that Mendocino's ability to achieve these goals is hampered by three quasi-market failures: interjurisdictional conflict, coproduction deficits, and devolution without adequate fiscal decentralization. A major driver in these quasi-market failures is the substantial regulatory and enforcement responsibility this governance system places on local government. We conclude by discussing some institutional structures that may address these failures.