Tor Langehaug

Mr. Tor Langehaug


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CACristian Agredo
Cristian Agredo
TLTor Langehaug
Tor Langehaug
SGScott Graham
Scott Graham
Modern computing systems are primarily designed for maximum performance, which inadvertently introduces vulnerabilities at the micro-architecture level. While cache side-channel analysis has received significant attention, other Central Processing Units (CPUs) components like the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) can also be exploited to leak sensitive information. This paper focuses on the TLB, a micro-architecture component that is vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Despite the coarse granularity at the page level, advancements in tools and techniques have made TLB information leakage feasible. The primary goal of this study is not to demonstrate the potential for information leakage from the TLB but to establish a comprehensive framework to reverse engineer the TLB configuration, a critical aspect of side-channel analysis attacks that have previously succeeded in extracting sensitive data. The methodology involves detailed reverse engineering efforts on Intel CPUs, complemented by analytical tools to support TLB reverse engineering. This study successfully reverse-engineered the TLB configurations for Intel CPUs and introduced visual tools for further analysis. These results can be used to explore TLB vulnerabilities in greater depth. However, when attempting to apply the same methodology to the IBM Power9, it became clear that the methodology was not transferable, as mapping functions and performance counters vary across different vendors.

22 February 2022 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TLTor Langehaug
Tor Langehaug
SGScott R. Graham
Scott R. Graham
CKChristine M. Schubert Kabban
Christine M. Schubert Kabban
BBBrett J. Borghetti
Brett J. Borghetti
In the aftermath of Spectre and Meltdown researchers have proposed a variety of attack detection solutions by applying machine learning to data collected from hardware performance monitoring units. Although many microarchitectural attack detection systems provide high-accuracy detection results, the behavior of the underlying data collection mechanisms is not well described or understood. This research introduces the MicroArchitectural Data Framework And Methodology (MADFAM) to prescribe a systematic approach to collecting and preserving the information available in sequences of microarchitectural data. The proposed framework focuses on hardware performance counters (HPCs) as the primary data source. HPC configuration is complex, which makes it difficult for others to reproduce results or advance the state-of-the-art. This framework includes a description of design decisions that HPC research must consider across an array of problem domains, including information security. MADFAM proposes a data collection architecture and evaluation criteria to improve the discussion about the experimental settings and design decisions used in HPC research. The proposed framework evaluation criteria are then used to establish a baseline characterization of time series data that future research can use to compare alternative framework implementations.

25 June 2025 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CACristian Agredo
Cristian Agredo
DKDaniel F. Koranek
Daniel F. Koranek
CKChristine M. Schubert Kabban
Christine M. Schubert Kabban
JAJose Gutierrez del Arroyo
Jose Gutierrez del Arroyo
TLTor Langehaug
Tor Langehaug
SGScott Graham
Scott Graham
The primary focus of modern Central Processing Unit (CPU) technologies is performance improvement, with security often considered a secondary concern. As a result, vulnerabilities within the system are overlooked. While significant research, both offensive and defensive, has been conducted on CPU caches, relatively little attention has been given to the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) due to its perceived lack of data granularity. Prior studies have typically combined multiple Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) or relied on timing analysis to extract meaningful insights. In contrast, this study introduces a novel methodology that leverages only TLB related HPCs for multi-task classification, without incorporating data from other microarchitectural components such as caches or branch predictors, and without relying on timing memory accesses. In the proposed methodology, an attacker uses HPCs to collect TLB based data while a victim executes tasks. We demonstrate that statistical learning models, including Random Forest (RF) and Logistic Regression (LR), achieve classification accuracy of up to 87%, surpassing the next best TLB only method (based on timing analysis) by 11%. Furthermore, neural networks, such as Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and Convolution Neural Network (CNN), achieve 88% accuracy, improving prior TLB based approaches by 12%. These findings demonstrate the potential of TLB based methodologies for task classification, victim monitoring, and future security enhancements in microarchitectural design.

1 January 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
TLTor Langehaug
Tor Langehaug
SGScott Graham
Scott Graham
The interactions between software and hardware are increasingly important to computer system security. This research collects sequences of microprocessor control signals to develop machine learning models that identify software tasks. The proposed approach considers software task identification in hardware as a general problem with attacks treated as a subset of software tasks. Two lines of effort are presented. First, a data collection approach is described to extract sequences of control signals labeled by task identity during real (i.e., non-simulated) system operation. Second, experimental design is used to select hardware and software configuration to train and evaluate machine learning models. The machine learning models significantly outperform a Naive classifier based on Euclidean distances from class means. Various configurations produce balanced accuracy scores between 26.08% and 96.89%.

14 September 2024 in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TLTor Langehaug
Tor Langehaug
SGScott Graham
Scott Graham
The interactions between software and hardware are increasingly important to computer system security. This research collected microprocessor control signal sequences to develop machine learning models that identify software tasks. In contrast with prior work that relies on hardware performance counters to collect data for task identification, this research is based on creating additional digital logic to record sequences of control signals inside a processor’s microarchitecture. The proposed approach considers software task identification in hardware as a general problem, with attacks treated as a subset of software tasks. Three lines of effort are presented. First, a data collection approach is described to extract sequences of control signals labeled by task identity during actual (i.e., non-simulated) system operation. Second, experimental design selects hardware and software configurations to train and evaluate machine learning models. The machine learning models significantly outperform a naïve classifier based on Euclidean distances from class means. Various experiment configurations produced a range of balanced accuracy scores. Third, task classification is addressed using decision boundaries defined with thresholds chosen by an optimization strategy to develop non-neural network classifiers. When implemented in hardware, the non-neural network classifiers could require less digital logic to implement compared to neural network models.