Stephan Müller

Prof. Dr. Stephan Müller


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2019 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SMStephan Müller
Stephan Müller
HRHolger A. Rau
Holger A. Rau

1 January 2020 in Journal of Economic Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SMStephan Müller
Stephan Müller
HRHolger A. Rau
Holger A. Rau

28 June 2017 in Managerial and Decision Economics
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
SMStephan Müller
Stephan Müller
GGGeorg Goetz
Georg Goetz

22 June 2017 in Journal of Evolutionary Economics
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Journal Article
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PDF file
SMStephan Müller
Stephan Müller
GWGeorg von Wangenheim
Georg von Wangenheim

1 November 2024 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
VBVolker Benndorf
Volker Benndorf
SMStephan Müller
Stephan Müller
HRHolger A. Rau
Holger A. Rau
This paper studies the impact of betrayal aversion on employees’ effort provision in exchange for a bonus payment that is at the employers’ expense and discretion. In our first study, using a laboratory experiment, we find that the performance of an employee with average betrayal aversion is lower by more than 15% relative to betrayal-neutral employees. Inspired by the findings, we theoretically identify a tradeoff for the effort provision of betrayal-averse employees. That is, higher effort not only increases the level of betrayal when the bonus is not paid, but it also increases the chances to receive a bonus avoiding betrayal. In a second study, we confirm our findings in an online labor market. The data also find support for the identified tradeoff. In a third study, we manipulate employees’ beliefs about the chances of receiving the bonus to provide causal evidence for the tradeoff. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by the Joachim Herz Foundation. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02405 .

7 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
IAItai Arieli
Itai Arieli
YBYakov Babichenkoyako
Yakov Babichenkoyako
SMStephan Müller
Stephan Müller
FPFarzad Pourbabaee
Farzad Pourbabaee
OTOmer Tamuz
Omer Tamuz
In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve when agents are mildly condescending. In contrast, too much condescension leads to worse outcomes, as does anti-condescension.