This paper contributes to the well-known challenge of active user participation in demand side management (DSM). In DSM, there is a need for modern pricing mechanisms that will be able to effectively...

Liberalized electricity markets, smart grids and high penetration of renewable energy sources (RESs) led to the development of novel markets, whose objective is the harmonization between production and demand, usually noted as real time of flexibility markets. This necessitates the development of novel pricing schemes able to allow energy service providers (ESPs) to maximize their aggregated profits from the traditional markets (trading between wholesale/day-ahead and retail markets) and the innovative flexibility markets. In the same time, ESPs have to offer their end users (consumers) competitive (low cost) energy services. In this context, novel pricing schemes must act, among others, as automated demand side management (DSM) techniques that are able to trigger the desired behavioral changes according to the flexibility market prices in energy consumption curves (ECCs) of the consumers. Energy pricing schemes proposed so far, e.g. real-time pricing, interact in an efficient way with wholesale market. But they do not provide strong enough financial incentives to consumers to modify their energy consumption habits towards energy cost curtailment. Thus, they do not interact efficiently with flexibility markets. Therefore, we develop a flexibility real-time pricing (FRTP) scheme, which offers a dynamically adjustable level of financial incentives to participating users by fairly rewarding the ones that make desirable behavioral changes in their ECCs. Performance evaluation results demonstrate that the proposed FRTP is able to offer a 15%–30% more attractive trade-off between the stacked profits of ESPs, i.e. the sum of the profits from retail and flexibility markets, and the satisfaction of the consumers.

The increasing renewable energy sources RES penetration in today’s energy islands and rural energy communities with weak grid connections is expected to incur severe distribution network stability problems (i.e., congestion, voltage issues). Tackling these problems is even more challenging since RES spillage minimization and energy cost minimization for the local energy community are set as major pre-requisites. In this paper, we consider a Microgrid Operator (MGO) that: (i) gradually decides the optimal mix of its RES and flexibility assets’ (FlexAsset) sizing, siting and operation, (ii) respects the physical distribution network constraints in high RES penetration contexts, and (iii) is able to bid strategically in the existing day-ahead energy market. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game, expressed as a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), which is finally transformed into a tractable Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP). The performance evaluation results show that the MGO can lower its costs when bidding strategically, while the coordinated planning and scheduling of its FlexAssets result in higher RES utilization, as well as distribution network aware and cost-effective RES and FlexAsset operation.