The recent climate emergency declaration by many nations around the world signifies the severity of the impact of climate change. As an entity which consumes a large quantity of resources ranging from material to human, corporations have a responsibility to seriously tackle climate change. As a company's board of directors is typically responsible for developing business strategies, including environmental strategies, this paper explores whether gender diversity on corporate boards affect firms' emission performance. Consistent with diversity theory, we find that board gender diversity is positively associated with firms' emission reduction performance. The likelihood that a firm with a gender diverse board reduces environmental emission is 9% higher than its industry peers. To ensure that our results are robust to endogeneity, we conduct additional analyses including propensity score matching (PSM), entropy balancing, and instrumental‐variable analysis.

We show the influence the size of a corporate board has on firms' ESG controversies. Our analysis suggests that businesses with larger boards are more effective in mitigating ESG controversies. Specifically, a rise in board size by one standard deviation results in a decline in ESG controversies by 4.30%. Our findings corroborate the anticipation that businesses need the board's advice to prevent ESG controversies. Thus, larger boards, with more human capital and more interactions with stakeholders, promote sustainability more effectively. Moreover, we find that the effect of board size is less pronounced during a stressful time but is more evident in companies with more agency problems. Further analysis validates the findings, that is, propensity score matching, entropy balancing, an instrumental‐variable analysis, and GMM dynamic panel data analysis.

Because of concentrated ownership stakes, board composition and longer-investment horizons, founding-family controlled firms provide an interesting setting for examining issues relating to governance and control. Anderson and Reeb ( 2003a Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. 2003a. Founding family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58: 1301–28. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar] , b Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. 2003b. Family ownership, corporate diversification, and firm leverage. Journal of Law and Economics, 46: 653–84. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar] , 2004 Anderson, R. and Reeb, D. 2004. Board composition: balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49: 209–37. [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar] ), find that the founding-family controlled structure results in superior stock market and accounting performance and lower cost of debt compared to their nonfamily controlled counterparts. We add to their findings by examining the relationships between founding family control and earnings management. The unique characteristics of family controlled firms could insulate these firms from pressures to manage earnings. Our results support this notion, and find that family firms are significantly less likely to manage earnings.

Carbon emissions have been identified as a major cause of global warming and are harmful to the environment. Given the seriousness of climate changes, businesses are encouraged to adopt corporate strategies to improve environmental performance. Staggered boards (or classified boards) are one of the controversial corporate governance devices being employed by corporations that protect managers from the market for corporate control. This paper explores whether staggered boards can be a useful business strategy to improve carbon emissions. Relying on a novel data set in which the presence of a staggered board is identified through advanced machine learning algorithms and textual analysis, we find that staggered boards bring about significantly worse emission performance by 10.67%. Our results corroborate the premise that staggered boards insulate self‐interested managers from market discipline and thus exacerbate agency problems, resulting in more unfavorable outcomes. Further analysis validates the results, that is, propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental‐variable analysis, and generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimation. Importantly, we include firm fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that de‐staggered boards may help improve emission performance.