We study dynamical game-theoretic models of two-level control systems accounting for the conditions of sustainable development. As the hierarchical control mechanisms we consider compulsion and impulsion methods. We give definitions of equilibria and show algorithms for constructing them with simulation modeling for various information regulations. We show a comparative analysis of the efficiency of the proposed control mechanisms for the model of an ecosystem of a shallow body of water (with the example of the Azov sea).
International experience demonstrates both the effectiveness and difficulties of using the mechanism of a public–private partnership (PPP) in solving socially significant problems of investment development of an innovative economy. The lack of tools to make an informed choice of the best PPP model in terms of the risks diversification is one of the significant problems of the predictive and analytical support of the relationship between business and government structures. The purpose of the study is to create and empirically test a multi-criteria modeling toolkit for the choice of the public–private partnership mechanism in relation to managing territorial sustainable development projects. Such problems as a structural representation of PPP risk factors and development of principles for their diversification, development of the algorithm and criteria for multi-criteria evaluation, testing of a multi-criteria model needed to be solved to achieve the research goal. The innovativeness of the author’s approach consists in substantiating the algorithm of the multi-criteria modeling for the choice of the public–private partnership mechanism in relation to managing sustainable development projects of the territory. Criteria for alternative PPP models evaluating have been developed. Based on the results of testing, the advantages and disadvantages of applying the algorithm of the multi-criteria modeling in sustainable development management are identified, the directions for the model using in regional management are disclosed.
A formal game-theoretic model of an intertwined supply network, in full and simplified versions, is proposed. Conditions for the sustainable development of an active system are presented in general form and then specified to the class of intertwined supply networks. As an illustration, a concise example of the dynamic Cournot duopoly and a detailed example of the model of Social and Private Interests Coordination Engines (SPICE-model) for a marketing network are considered and analytically investigated and sustainability conditions are established. An important conclusion is that the sustainable development of the active system is possible only under the viability conditions satisfied simultaneously with coordinating the interests of all active agents of the system.
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the efficiency of organizational modes (information structures) for the interaction of economic agents in static and dynamic Cournot duopoly models. We compare the independent behavior of equal players, their cooperation, and the hierarchy formalized as Germeier games. The efficiency of individual players and the entire society is quantitatively assessed using the private and social relative efficiency indices. The ecological safety conditions of the system are investigated. An organizational and economic interpretation of the results is proposed.
This paper analyzes conditions of system compatibility in the game-theoretic models of resource allocation between social and private activities. We describe economic and administrative control...