Dzhabarov and Ziemba investigate whether traditional seasonal anomalies, such as the January effect,monthly effect, January barometer, sell-in-May-and-go-away phenomenon, holiday effect, and turn-of-the-month effect, still exist in the turbulent markets of the early part of the 21st century.The evidence indicates that there is still value in these anomalies. In their study, the authors use futures data from 1993 to 2009 and from 2004 to 2009 for small-cap stocks measured by the Russell 2000 Index and for large-cap stocks measured by the S&P 500 Index.As was true in the 1990s, the effects tend to be stronger in small-cap stocks.The results are useful for investors who wish to tilt portfolios and for speculators who wish to trade the effects.
31 July 2011 in The Journal of Portfolio Management
William Poundstone’s book, Fortune’s Formula, brought the Kelly capital growth criterion to the attention of investors. But how do full and fractional Kelly strategies perform in practice? The authors study three simple investment situations and simulate the behavior of these strategies over medium-term horizons using a large number of scenarios. The results show 1) the great superiority of full Kelly and close-to-full Kelly strategies over longer horizons in that they earn very large gains a large fraction of the time, 2) the very risky short-term performance of Kelly and high-fractional Kelly strategies, 3) a consistent trade-off of growth versus security as a function of the bet size determined by the various strategies, and 4) no matter how favorable the investment opportunities are, or how long the finite horizon is, a sequence of bad scenarios can lead to very poor final wealth outcomes with a loss of most of the investor’s initial capital. Hence, in practice, financial engineering is important for ...
31 October 2015 in The Journal of Portfolio Management
The Kelly capital growth investment strategy maximizes the expected utility of final wealth with a Bernoulli logarithmic utility function. In 1956, Kelly showed that static expected log maximization yields the maximum asymptotic long-run growth. Good properties include minimizing the time to large asymptotic goals, maximizing the median, and being ahead (on average) after the first period. Bad properties include extremely large bets for short-term favorable investment situations because the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion index is essentially zero. Paul Samuelson was a critic of this approach, and his criticism is partially responsible for the fact that most finance academics and investment professionals do not recommend Kelly strategies. Samuelson’s points are theoretically correct and sharpen the theory, cautioning Kelly investors to understand the strategy’s true characteristics, including ways to lower investment exposure. His objections help us better understand the theory without detracting from its numerous valuable applications.
We study the land and stock markets in Japan circa 1990 and in 2013. While the Nikkei stock average in the late 1980s and its % crash in 1990 is generally recognized as a financial market bubble, a bigger bubble and crash was in the land market. The crash in the Nikkei which started on the first trading day of 1990 was predictable in April 1989 using the bond-stock earnings yield model which signalled a crash but not its exact moment. We show that it was possible to use the changepoint detection model based solely on price movements for profitable exits of long positions both circa 1990 and in 2013.
Gergaud and Ziemba discuss the records of some great investors and hedge fund managers. The investors’ graphs of wealth over time lead to a search for smooth monotone paths and a fair way to evaluate superior as opposed to average investors. Some investors prefer high long-run growth and accept bumps rather than smooth wealth paths and lower growth. These include some Kelly criterion investors such as Buffett, Keynes, and Soros who have concentrated portfolios with few asset positions. In 2005 Ziemba proposed a modification, following an earlier proposal by Ziemba and Schwartz in 1991, of the ordinary normal distribution?based Sharpe ratio to evaluate right-skewed great investor portfolios. This measure only counts losses and is useful in evaluating superior investors such as the Renaissance Medallion hedge fund, which has a high rating by the modified downside symmetric Sharpe ratio (DSSR) as opposed to having only a modest rating with the ordinary Sharpe ratio. Using the University of Massachusetts hedge fund database, Gergaud and Ziemba discuss some funds with superior records and from their evaluation learn more about the properties of the DSSR and the modified downside symmetric information ratio.