The powerful allure of social media platforms has been attributed to the human need for social rewards. Here, we demonstrate that the spread of misinformation on such platforms is facilitated by existing social ‘carrots’ (e.g., ‘likes’) and ‘sticks’ (e.g., ‘dislikes’) that are dissociated from the veracity of the information shared. Testing 951 participants over six experiments, we show that a slight change to the incentive structure of social media platforms, such that social rewards and punishments are contingent on information veracity, produces a considerable increase in the discernment of shared information. Namely, an increase in the proportion of true information shared relative to the proportion of false information shared. Computational modeling (i.e., drift-diffusion models) revealed the underlying mechanism of this effect is associated with an increase in the weight participants assign to evidence consistent with discerning behavior. The results offer evidence for an intervention that could be adopted to reduce misinformation spread, which in turn could reduce violence, vaccine hesitancy and political polarization, without reducing engagement.
Over 5 billion people now use social media platforms. As our social lives become increasingly entangled with online social networks, it is important to understand the dynamics of online information diffusion. This is particularly true for the political domain, as political elites, disinformation profiteers, and social activists all use social media to gain influence by spreading information. Recent work found that emotional expressions related to morality (moral-emotion expression) are associated with increased diffusion of political messages—a phenomenon we called “moral contagion.” Here, we perform a large, pre-registered direct replication (N = 849,266) of Brady et al. using the dictionary methods from the original paper, as well as new large-language models. We also conduct a meta-analysis of all available data testing moral contagion (5 labs, 27 studies, N = 4,821,006). The estimate of moral contagion in the available population is positive and significant (IRR = 1.13, 95% CI = [1.06, 1.20]), such that for each additional moral–emotional word in a post, the expected number of shares was 13% greater. The mean effect size of the pre-registered replication (IRR = 1.17) better estimated the population effect than the original study (IRR = 1.20). Contrary to prior work, we find that the moral contagion model substantially outperforms nonsense models of diffusion (“XYZ contagion model”). Moral contagion was also conceptually replicated when moral–emotional content was measured using state-of-the-art natural language processing methods. These findings reveal that the moral contagion effect is highly robust across datasets and methods.
Misinformation has risen in recent years, negatively affecting domains ranging from politics to health. To curb the spread of misinformation it is useful to consider why, how, and when people decide to share information. Here we suggest that information-sharing decisions are value-based choices, in which sharers strive to maximize rewards and minimize losses to themselves and/or others. These outcomes can be tangible, in the form of monetary rewards or losses, or intangible, in the form of social feedback. On social media platforms these rewards and losses are not clearly tied to the accuracy of information shared. Thus, sharers have little incentive to avoid disseminating misinformation. Based on this framework, we propose ways to nudge sharers to prioritize accuracy during information-sharing.
Much research finds that lying takes longer than truth-telling. Yet, the source of this response time difference remains elusive. Here, we assessed the spatiotemporal evolution of electrical brain activity during honesty and dishonesty in 150 participants using a sophisticated electrical neuroimaging approach—the microstate approach. This uniquely positioned us to identify and contrast the entire chain of mental processes involved during honesty and dishonesty. Specifically, we find that the response time difference is the result of an additional late-occurring mental process, unique to dishonest decisions, interrupting the antecedent mental processing. We suggest that this process inhibits the activation of the truth, thus permitting the execution of the lie. These results advance our understanding of dishonesty and clarify existing theories about the role of increased cognitive load. More broadly, we demonstrate the vast potential of our approach to illuminate the temporal organization of mental processes involved in decision-making.
When faced with a threat, peoples’ estimate of risk guides their response. When danger is to the self as well as to others two estimates are generated: the risk to oneself and the risk to others. As these estimates likely differ, it is unclear how exactly they drive a response. To answer this question, we studied a large representative sample of Americans facing the COVID-19 pandemic at two time points (N1=1145, N2=683). We discover a paradoxical duality: a tendency to be optimistic about one’s own risk of infection (private optimism) while at the same time to be pessimistic about the risk to others (public pessimism). These two estimates were found to be differentially related to affect and choice. First, private optimism, but not public pessimism, was associated with people’s positive feelings. The association between private optimism and positive affect was mediated by people’s sense of agency over their future. However, negative affect was related to both private risk perception and public risk perception. Second, people predominantly engaged in protective behaviors based on their estimated risk to the population rather than to themselves. This suggests that people were predominantly engaging in protective behaviors for the benefit of others. The findings are important for understanding how people’s beliefs about their own future and that of others are related to protective behaviors and well-being.