Andrew Tedder

Dr. Andrew Tedder


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 November 2014 in The Review of Symbolic Logic
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ATAndrew Tedder
Andrew Tedder
The collapse models of arithmetic are inconsistent, nontrivial models obtained from ℕ and set out in the Logic of Paradox (LP). They are given a general treatment by Priest (Priest, 2000). Finite collapse models are decidable, and thus axiomatizable, because finite. LP, however, is ill-suited to normal axiomatic reasoning, as it invalidates Modus Ponens, and almost all other usual conditional inferences. I set out a logic, A3, first given by Avron (Avron, 1991), and give a first order axiom system for the finite collapse models. I present some standard arithmetical axioms in addition to a cyclic axiom and prove that these axioms are sound and complete for the cyclic models, reporting a similar result for the heap models. The state of the situation for the each of the kinds of infinite collapse model is, however, left an open question.

15 October 2021 in Journal of Philosophical Logic
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ATAndrew Tedder
Andrew Tedder
NFNicholas Ferenz
Nicholas Ferenz

29 June 2022 in Journal of Philosophical Logic
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NFNicholas Ferenz
Nicholas Ferenz
ATAndrew Tedder
Andrew Tedder

7 February 2023 in Journal of Philosophical Logic
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FMFranci Mangraviti
Franci Mangraviti
ATAndrew Tedder
Andrew Tedder
The relationship between logics with sets of theorems including contradictions (“inconsistent logics”) and theories closed under such logics is investigated. It is noted that if we take “theories” to be defined in terms of deductive closure understood in a way somewhat different from the standard, Tarskian, one, inconsistent logics can have consistent theories. That is, we can find some sets of formulas the closure of which under some inconsistent logic need not contain any contradictions. We prove this in a general setting for a family of relevant connexive logics, extract the essential features of the proof in order to obtain a sufficient condition for the consistency of a theory in arbitrary logics, and finally consider some concrete examples of consistent mathematical theories in Abelian logic. The upshot is that on this way of understanding deductive closure, common to relevant logics, there is a rich and interesting kind of interaction between inconsistent logics and their theories. We argue that this suggests an important avenue for investigation of inconsistent logics, from both a technical and a philosophical perspective.

24 May 2022 in Synthese
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ATAndrew Tedder
Andrew Tedder
MBMarta Bilkova
Marta Bilkova

1 January 2018 in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
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ATAndrew Tedder
Andrew Tedder
GBGuillermo Badia
Guillermo Badia
PCPhilosophy Documentation Center
Philosophy Documentation Center
Beall and Cotnoir (2017) argue that theists may accept the claim that God’s omnipotence is fully unrestricted if they also adopt a suitable nonclassical logic. Their primary focus is on the infamous Stone problem (i.e., whether God can create a stone too heavy for God to lift). We show how unrestricted omnipotence generates Curry-like paradoxes. The upshot is that Beall and Cotnoir only provide a solution to one version of the Stone problem, but that unrestricted omnipotence generates other problems which they do not adequately address.