The turn to historical methods and suspicion of universal theories of religion has led to an ethos of particularism in which the increasing data of religions are treated like atomistic and self-sufficient units of knowledge. But as complex systems, religions exhibit patterns that are visible only when we look beyond the most particulate scale of analysis, similar to phenomena examined in the natural and social sciences. To see religions as complex and dynamic systems enables us to resist the fragmentation of knowledge, account for change without sacrificing systemic consistency, and formulate generalizations that allow for comparison across religious systems. The study of Buddhism is used as a reference point for these methodological discussions.
27 March 2008 in Journal of the American Academy of Religion
A number of recent publications in the study of religion address the continuing question about the legitimacy and coherence of the concept of “religion.” This essay examines three particular critiques—(1) that “religion” is a Christian theological construct with questionable applications to non-Christian cultures, (2) that “religion” lacks coherence and empirical warrant as an analytical category, and (3) that the study of religion needs to be rendered more scientific through reductive theory and methods. These claims often take the natural sciences as the standard against which the study of religion is found lacking. Given the drastic nature of what these reflections on the study of religion imply or recommend, it is important to investigate whether or not such critiques are warranted. This essay argues that the study of science actually suggests more similarities than differences, and that the history and philosophy of science render the academic study of religion into a comparable “research tradition.”
Classic Buddhist thought understands the mind as arising in dependence on the body. This causal dependence may be fashioned as a kind of “Buddhist materialism”. However, this should not be confused with any variety of scientific materialism, in which ontological and/or causal reductions of mind to brain affirm matter as the fundamental entity or property. Buddhist materialism, in contrast, is a purely phenomenological description that rejects both “mind” and “matter” as entities possessing substance or essential natures. This view questions the presumption that matter is external, real, and scientifically accessible, whereas mind is internal, subjective, and harder to empirically observe. Instead, perceptions of mind and matter are understood to be different kinds of experiences of equal phenomenological reality.
27 March 2008 in Journal of the American Academy of Religion
WE AGREE WITH MANY of the valuable and significant observations made by Ed Slingerland (2008) in “Who's Afraid of Reductionism?” We agree that: (i) all meaning making is intrinsically reductive, (ii) it is productive to apply the tools of cognitive science to religious phenomena and view human beings as integrated mind–body systems, and (iii) there are physical commonalities among all humans which similarly ground and constrain social practices.
(2013). Unnatural comparisons: commentary on Robert McCauley's Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not. Religion, Brain & Behavior: Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 119-125.