We examine smallholder farmers’ willingness to pay for agricultural technology and whether information is a constraint to adoption of certified maize seed in Northern Uganda. The uptake of improved maize varieties by smallholder farmers in Uganda remains persistently low, despite the higher yield potential compared to traditional varieties. A recently growing body of literature identifies information constraints as a potential barrier to adoption of agricultural technologies. We used incentive compatible Becker‐DeGroot‐Marschak auctions to elicit willingness to pay for quality assured improved maize seed by 1,009 smallholder farmers, and conducted a randomised evaluation to test the effect of an information intervention on farmers’ knowledge of seed certification. Our results show that the randomised information treatment enhanced farmers’ knowledge of certified seed. However, using the information treatment as an instrumental variable for knowledge, we find no evidence of a causal effect of knowledge on willingness to pay, suggesting that even though farmers are information constrained, this constraint does not affect adoption of certified seed directly. Nevertheless, only 14% of sampled farmers were willing to pay the market price, which corresponds closely with actual observed demand for certified seed in the previous season. This suggests that there are other barriers to adoption than information and awareness.
The Indonesian national health insurance agency BPJS Kesehatan, the largest single-payer system in the world, is among the first to combine capitation-based payments with performance-based financing. The Kapitasi Berbasis Komitmen (KBK) scheme for puskesmas (community health centres) was implemented in province capitals between August 2015 and May 2016. Its main goal was to incentivize the substitution of secondary by primary care use. We evaluate its effect on its three incentivized outcomes: the fraction of insured visiting the puskesmas, the fraction of chronically ill with a puskesmas visit and the hospital referral rate for insured with a non-specialistic condition. We use BPJS Kesehatan claims data from 2015 to 2016 from a stratified one percent sample of its members. Comparable control districts were identified using coarsened exact matching. We adopt a Difference-in-Differences (DID) study design and estimate a two-way fixed effects regression model to compare 27 intervention districts to 300 comparable non-capital control districts. We find that KBK payment increased the monthly percentage of enrolees contacting a puskesmas with 0.578 percentage points. This is a sizeable increase of 48 percent compared to the baseline rate of just 1.2% but it still leaves most puskesmas far below the "sufficient" KBK threshold of 15%. For chronically ill patients, a small increase of 1.15 percentage points was estimated, but it leaves the rate even further below the program's "sufficient" threshold of 50%. We find no statistically significant effect on referral rates to hospitals for conditions not requiring specialist care. While we find positive effects of KBK on two out of three outcomes, all estimated effect sizes leave the actual rates far below the program targets. Our findings suggest that the KBK performance-based capitation reform has not been very successful in substituting secondary care use by greater primary care use.