Ananish Chaudhuri

Prof. Ananish Chaudhuri

Head of the Department of Economics, University of Auckland Business School, Room 660 Owen G Glenn Building Level 6, 12 Grafton Road, Auckland, New Zealand
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 March 2011 in Experimental Economics
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ACAnanish Chaudhuri
Ananish Chaudhuri
I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching.

1 January 2009 in Southern Economic Journal
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VAVivi Alatas
Vivi Alatas
LCLisa Cameron
Lisa Cameron
ACAnanish Chaudhuri
Ananish Chaudhuri
NENisvan Erkal
Nisvan Erkal
LGLata Gangadharan
Lata Gangadharan

1 April 2007 in Southern Economic Journal
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ACAnanish Chaudhuri
Ananish Chaudhuri
LGLata Gangadharan
Lata Gangadharan

30 March 2020 in Nature Human Behaviour
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SCScott Claessens
Scott Claessens
KFKyle Fischer
Kyle Fischer
ACAnanish Chaudhuri
Ananish Chaudhuri
CSChris G. Sibley
Chris G. Sibley
QAQuentin D. Atkinson
Quentin D. Atkinson

14 March 2009 in Experimental Economics
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VAVivi Alatas
Vivi Alatas
LCLisa Cameron
Lisa Cameron
ACAnanish Chaudhuri
Ananish Chaudhuri
NENisvan Erkal
Nisvan Erkal
LGLata Gangadharan
Lata Gangadharan
We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Our results suggest that the Indonesian public servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students. We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the subjects for their behaviour suggest that the differences in behavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. For example, when abstaining from corruption, public servants more often cite the need to reduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging in corruption, they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evil in the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. We conclude by emphasizing that results obtained from different subject pools can complement each other in illuminating different aspects of the same problem.

25 September 2017 in Scientific Reports
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ACAnanish Chaudhuri
Ananish Chaudhuri
TPTirnud Paichayontvijit
Tirnud Paichayontvijit
We use decision-making experiments with human participants to study cooperation in a laboratory public goods game. Such games pose a conflict between cooperating, which is socially optimal and free-riding, which promotes individual self-interest. Prior research emphasizes the need for de-centralized peer-to-peer punishments as an evolutionarily stable response to the problem of free-riding, especially where interactions occur over long horizons. We show that a simple exhortative message appealing to participants’ goodwill can achieve high rates of cooperation in social dilemmas played over many rounds, even in the absence of punishments for free-riding.