Purpose Quality of life (QOL) is an important concept in the field of health and medicine. QOL is a complex concept that is interpreted and defined differently within and between disciplines, including the fields of health and medicine. The aims of this study were to systematically review the literature on QOL in medicine and health research and to describe the country of origin, target groups, instruments, design, and conceptual issues. Methods A systematic review was conducted to identify research studies on QOL and health-related quality of life (HRQOL). The databases Scopus, which includes Embase and MEDLINE, CINAHL, and PsycINFO were searched for articles published during one random week in November 2016. The ten predefined criteria of Gill and Feinstein were used to evaluate the conceptual and methodological rigor. Results QOL research is international and involves a variety of target groups, research designs, and QOL measures. According to the criteria of Gill and Feinstein, the results show that only 13% provided a definition of QOL, 6% distinguished QOL from HRQOL. The most frequently fulfilled criteria were: (i) stating the domains of QOL to be measured; (ii) giving a reason for choosing the instruments used; and (iii) aggregating the results from multiple items. Conclusion QOL is an important endpoint in medical and health research, and QOL research involves a variety of patient groups and different research designs. Based on the current evaluation of the methodological and conceptual clarity of QOL research, we conclude that the majority QOL studies in health and medicine have conceptual and methodological challenges.

Seventy six senior academics from 11 countries invite The BMJ’s editors to reconsider their policy of rejecting qualitative research on the grounds of low priority. They challenge the journal to develop a proactive, scholarly, and pluralist approach to research that aligns with its stated mission

Modern medicine is confronted with cultural crossings in various forms. In facing these challenges, it is not enough to simply increase our insight into the cultural dimensions of health and well-being. We must, more radically, question the conventional distinction between the ‘objectivity of science’ and the ‘subjectivity of culture’. This obligation creates an urgent call for the medical humanities but also for a fundamental rethinking of their grounding assumptions. Julia Kristeva (JK) has problematised the biomedical concept of health through her reading of the anthropogony of Cura (Care), who according to the Roman myth created man out of a piece of clay. JK uses this fable as an allegory for the cultural distinction between health construed as a ‘definitive state’, which belongs to biological life (bios), and healing as a durative ‘process with twists and turns in time’ that characterises human living (zoe). A consequence of this demarcation is that biomedicine is in constant need of ‘repairing’ and bridging the gap between bios and zoe, nature and culture. Even in radical versions, the medical humanities are mostly reduced to such an instrument of repairment, seeing them as what we refer to as a soft, ‘subjective’ and cultural supplement to a stable body of ‘objective’, biomedical and scientific knowledge. In this article, we present a prolegomenon to a more radical programme for the medical humanities, which calls the conventional distinctions between the humanities and the natural sciences into question, acknowledges the pathological and healing powers of culture, and sees the body as a complex biocultural fact. A key element in such a project is the rethinking of the concept of ‘evidence’ in healthcare.

The evidence-based practice and evidence-based medicine (EBM) movements have promoted standardization through guideline development methodologies based on systematic reviews and meta-analyses of best available research. EBM has challenged clinicians to question their reliance on practical reasoning and clinical judgement. In this paper, we argue that the protagonists of EBM position their mission as reducing uncertainty through the use of standardized methods for knowledge evaluation and use. With this drive towards uniformity, standardization and control comes a suspicion towards intuition, creativity and uncertainty as integral parts of medical practice. We question the appropriateness of attempts to standardize professional practice through a discussion of the importance of uncertainty. Greenhalgh’s taxonomy of uncertainty is used to inform an analysis of the clinical reasoning occurring in a potentially life threatening emergency situation with a young patient. The case analysis is further developed by the use of the Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan’s theory about understanding and objective knowing. According to Lonergan it is not by getting rid of or even by reducing uncertainty, but by attending systematically to it and by relating to it in a self-conscious way, that objective knowledge can be obtained. The paper concludes that uncertainty is not a regrettable and unavoidable aspect of decision making but a productive component of clinical reasoning.

Evidence‐based health care (EBHC), previously evidence‐based medicine (EBM), is considered by many to have modernized health care and brought it from an authority‐based past to a more rationalist, scientific grounding. But recent concerns and criticisms pose serious challenges and urge us to look at the fundamentals of a changing EBHC.In this paper, we present French philosopher Bruno Latour's vision on modernity as a framework to discuss current changes in the discourse on EBHC/EBM. Drawing on Latour's work, we argue that the early EBM movement had a strong modernist agenda with an aim to “purify” clinical reality into a dichotomy of objective “evidence” from nature and subjective “preferences” from human society and culture.However, we argue that this shift has proved impossible to achieve in reality. Several recent developments appear to point to a demise of purified evidence in the EBHC discourse and a growing recognition—albeit implicit and undertheorized—that evidence in clinical decision making is relentlessly situated and contextual. The unique, individual patient, not abstracted truths from distant research studies, must be the starting point for clinical practice. It follows that the EBHC community needs to reconsider the assumption that science should be abstracted from culture and acknowledge that knowledge from human culture and nature both need translation and interpretation. The implications for clinical reasoning are far reaching. We offer some preliminary principles for conceptualizing EBHC as a “situated practice” rather than as a sequence of research‐driven abstract decisions.

In this conceptual paper, we argue that at times of crisis, what is sometimes called "evidence-based" or "science-driven" policymaking-establishing scientific truths and then implementing them-must be tempered by a more agile, deliberative and inclusive approach which acknowledges and embraces uncertainty. We offer pragmatism as one potential option, using examples from the UK to illustrate how such an approach might have changed particular crisis decisions and led to better outcomes. We propose that to better prepare for the next public health crisis, five pragmatism-informed shifts are needed in the science-policy relationship: from scientism to science-informed narrative rationality that emerges from practice; from knowledge-then-action to acting judiciously under uncertainty; from hierarchies of evidence to pluralist inquiry; from polarized camps to frame-reflective dialogue; and from an "inside-track" science-policy dialogue to greater participatory democracy. We suggest an agenda for a pragmatist-informed program of applied research on crisis public health policymaking.