David Faigman

David Faigman


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

25Years (2002-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 2005 in Annual Review of Psychology
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Journal Article
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DFDavid Faigman
David Faigman
JMJohn Monahan
John Monahan
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., holding that the admissibility of scientific evidence depends on its scientific merit, has made American law receptive to valid science to an unprecedented degree. We review the implications for psychology of the law's taking science seriously. We consider the law before Daubert, and the ways that Daubert as well as modifications to the Federal Rules of Evidence have affected the admissibility of expert testimony. We describe the ramifications of these changes for psychology used as authority to create a general legal rule, as evidence to determine a specific fact, and as framework to provide context. Finally, future prospects for improving psychological testimony are offered: Court-appointed experts will increase the psychological sophistication of judges and juries, and evidence-based practices on the part of psychologists will increase the sophistication of the expert testimony that they proffer in court.

19 July 2002 in Science
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Journal Article
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DFDavid Faigman
David Faigman
Courts are obligated to evaluate the basis for proffered expert opinion to determine whether it is reliable and valid. This gate-keeping requirement compels them to review a wide variety of expertises, from auto mechanics to physicists. Increasingly, in the area of forensic science in particular, courts have begun to question whether the scientific method ought to be the touchstone by which they examine expert opinions, because doing so would appear to require the exclusion of evidence, such as fingerprinting, that is a staple of the trial process. In this Policy Forum, [D. L. Faigman][1] argues that the scientific method should be the touchstone by which all experts are judged. Scientists can be instrumental in assisting courts in the admittedly difficult task of evaluating the wide range of experts and expertises that make their way into court. [1]: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/297/5580/339

18 December 2014 in Sociological Methods & Research
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Journal Article
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ADA. Philip Dawid
A. Philip Dawid
DFDavid Faigman
David Faigman
SFStephen E. Fienberg
Stephen E. Fienberg
We welcome Professor Pearl’s comment on our original article, Dawid et al. Our focus there on the distinction between the “Effects of Causes” (EoC) and the “Causes of Effects” (CoE) concerned two fundamental problems, one a theoretical challenge in statistics and the other a practical challenge for trial courts. In this response, we seek to accomplish several things. First, using Pearl’s own notation, we attempt to clarify the similarities and differences between his technical approach and that in Dawid et al. Second, we consider the more practical challenges for CoE in the trial court setting, and explain why we believe Pearl’s analyses, as described via his example, fail to address these. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.

19 December 2013 in Sociological Methods & Research
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Journal Article
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ADA. Philip Dawid
A. Philip Dawid
DFDavid Faigman
David Faigman
SFStephen E. Fienberg
Stephen E. Fienberg

15 December 2020
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Book Chapter
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DFDavid Faigman
David Faigman