Michael Faure

Prof. Dr. Michael Faure


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

32Years (1995-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 June 2011 in Journal of Consumer Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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MFMichael Faure
Michael Faure
HLHanneke A. Luth
Hanneke A. Luth
The domain of behavioural law and economics is winning increasing attention also in the field of consumer policy. How the insights of behavioural law and economics can be used in policy remains, to a large extent, unclear. In this article, the following question is asked: “To what extent can the insights from the behavioural literature be applied in a way to formulate concrete suggestions to policy makers?” The authors show that many of the findings of the behavioural literature are very context-specific and hence apply only with respect to particular products or services and particular consumer groups. Formulating general policy conclusions is therefore difficult. However, as far as the specific domain of standard form contracts is concerned, the authors argue that the behavioural literature has shown that the traditional remedy (mostly resulting from information economics), being to focus on information disclosure will not be able to remedy market failures resulting from failing information and the "signing-without-reading-problem." Hence, more substantive forms of intervention in standard form contracts (e.g., resulting from collective bargaining) may be indicated as a remedy.

2 May 2012 in Journal of Environmental Law
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Journal Article
Closed access
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MFMichael Faure
Michael Faure
KSKatarina Svatikova
Katarina Svatikova
This article studies the scope of criminal and administrative law enforcement of environmental violations in four Western European jurisdictions. The Flemish Region and the United Kingdom have, until mid-2009, largely relied only on criminal sanctioning while administrative sanctions, which have also been in use since mid-2009, have already been widely used in the Netherlands and Germany. This article considers whether, given a fixed budget for the relevant national environment agency, single (criminal) or multiple (criminal and administrative) enforcement instruments are adequate to induce compliance. The fact that administrative proceedings are less strict and more informal than criminal proceedings suggests that the imposition of administrative sanctions is a relatively cheaper alternative. Therefore, in case of environmental violations, it is cost-effective to complement criminal law enforcement by administrative law rather than to allow for a single (criminal) sanctioning instrument. Complementary use of these two instruments might lead to additional deterrence. Data is presented to illustrate this argument.

10 July 2020 in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
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Journal Article
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YSYayun Shen
Yayun Shen
MFMichael Faure
Michael Faure
Green buildings can play a role in helping countries meet their commitments under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Green building can provide an important contribution to sustainability, for example, by improving energy efficiency, by improving indoor air quality, and by effective waste treatment. In practice, we see that there is an increasing interest in various forms of green building. However, the existing literature has not identified the role of law in promoting green building. It is, moreover, striking that green building has taken off in a rather impressive manner in China. Although generally there are still huge environmental problems with which China is confronted, for many years already China has been engaged in green building. This paper wants to examine what explains the relative success of green building in China; What specific legal instruments can be used to promote green building; and what lessons can be drawn more generally from experience in China? The paper uses the theory of smart regulation (Gunningham/Grabosky) and the economic analysis of law to examine the importance of different instruments in promoting green building. The paper comes to two key results, being that no single instrument in itself is optimal to promote green building as a result of which a smart mix needs to be designed to promote green building; moreover, for the specific case of China, it is the large government involvement in the economy that has been able to jump-start green building. The Chinese government has, on the one hand, mandated green building in government projects, but on the other hand, also used market-based instruments (like subsidies and public procurement) to promote green building.

1 January 2005 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Preprint
Open access
MFMichael Faure
Michael Faure
This paper applies an economic analysis of law to the question under what conditions insurance should be made compulsory. A distinction is made between first party (victim) insurance and third party (liability) insurance. It is argued that under some circumstances compulsory victim insurance may be valid e.g. when information problems or externalities arise. The major argument in favour of compulsory liability insurance is insolvency of the potential injurer. His insolvency may lead to underdeterrence. This can be cured through making the purchase of insurance compulsory. However, equally, a few limits and warnings with respect to the introduction of a duty to ensure are presented. If the moral hazard problem cannot be cured or if insurance is not sufficiently available making insurance compulsory may solve more problems than it cures. Also, it is argued that a major disadvantage of compulsory insurance is that it may make governments too dependant on the insurance market.

19 March 2020 in Climate Law
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Journal Article
Open access
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DHDirk Heine
Dirk Heine
MFMichael Faure
Michael Faure
GDGoran Dominioni
Goran Dominioni
There is a lively debate among scholars and policymakers on whether either consumers or producers should be seen as responsible for pollution caused in the production and consumption of traded goods. In this article, we argue that, in conformity with intuitive conceptions of causation, the economic incidence of a Pigouvian tax can be seen as a measure of the relative contribution to pollution of consumers and producers. Taking this perspective on the polluter-pays principle can help increase ambition in climate change action because it reduces the relevance of the question “Who is the polluter?” in climate change negotiations and enables a focus instead on the issue of “What can be done?” to reduce carbon emissions.

20 July 2010 in The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice
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Journal Article
Closed access
VBVéronique Bruggeman
Véronique Bruggeman
MFMichael Faure
Michael Faure
KFKarine Fiore
Karine Fiore