Tatjana Aue

Prof. Tatjana Aue

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2015 in Clinical Psychology Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TATatjana Aue
Tatjana Aue
HOHadas Okon-Singer
Hadas Okon-Singer

1 January 2013 in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
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Journal Article
Open access
TATatjana Aue
Tatjana Aue
RGRaphaël Guex
Raphaël Guex
LCLéa A. S. Chauvigné
Léa A. S. Chauvigné
HOHadas Okon-Singer
Hadas Okon-Singer
Phobic individuals display an attention bias to phobia-related information and biased expectancies regarding the likelihood of being faced with such stimuli. Notably, although attention and expectancy biases are core features in phobia and anxiety disorders, these biases have mostly been investigated separately and their causal impact has not been examined. We hypothesized that these biases might be causally related. Spider phobic and low spider fearful control participants performed a visual search task in which they specified whether the deviant animal in a search array was a spider or a bird. Shorter reaction times (RTs) for spiders than for birds in this task reflect an attention bias toward spiders. Participants' expectancies regarding the likelihood of these animals being the deviant in the search array were manipulated by presenting verbal cues. Phobics were characterized by a pronounced and persistent attention bias toward spiders; controls displayed slower RTs for birds than for spiders only when spider cues had been presented. More important, we found RTs for spider detections to be virtually unaffected by the expectancy cues in both groups, whereas RTs for bird detections showed a clear influence of the cues. Our results speak to the possibility that evolution has formed attentional systems that are specific to the detection of phylogenetically salient stimuli such as threatening animals; these systems may not be as penetrable to variations in (experimentally induced) expectancies as those systems that are used for the detection of non-threatening stimuli. In sum, our findings highlight the relation between expectancies and attention engagement in general. However, expectancies may play a greater role in attention engagement in safe environments than in threatening environments.

1 December 2016 in Biological Psychology
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Journal Article
Closed access
TATatjana Aue
Tatjana Aue
LCLéa A.S. Chauvigné
Léa A.S. Chauvigné
MBMirko Bristle
Mirko Bristle
HOHadas Okon-Singer
Hadas Okon-Singer
RGRaphaël Guex
Raphaël Guex

15 March 2021 in PLOS ONE
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Journal Article
Open access
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TATatjana Aue
Tatjana Aue
SBStephanie Bührer
Stephanie Bührer
BMBoris Mayer
Boris Mayer
MDMihai Dricu
Mihai Dricu
Accounts of empathy distinguish between cognitive (attribution of mental states to a social target) and emotional (sharing of emotions with a social target) empathy. To date, however, little is known about whether and how (interactions between) person perceptions, situational characteristics, and the observer-target relationship affect these constructs. The current study hence investigated (a) how the perceived warmth and competence of different social targets relate to both types of empathy, (b) whether there are differences in empathic responding to positive vs. negative scenarios, and (c) the impact of identification with the social targets. Eighty-nine participants rated cognitive and emotional empathy regarding four stereotypical target characters (student, elderly person, businessperson, alcoholic person) facing diverse positive and negative events. They also rated how warm and competent these characters appeared to them and how strongly they identified with the social targets. Results for cognitive and emotional empathy were partly overlapping, but demonstrated several significant differences, thereby demonstrating the need to investigate the two concepts separately. Notably, stereotypes of warmth predicted both cognitive and emotional empathic responses more strongly in desirable than in undesirable scenarios, which may relate to greater freedom of response to positive (rather than negative) social outcomes permitted by society. Our data show that scenario valence mattered even more for cognitive (than for emotional) empathy because it additionally moderated the effects of perceived competence and social identification. Finally, both cognitive and emotional empathy increased as a positive function of social identification, and social identification moderated effects exerted by perceived warmth and competence (yet differently for the two types of empathy investigated). Together, these findings speak to empathic responses arising from a complex interplay between perceptions (i.e., warmth and competence), scenario valence, and social identification.

16 April 2020 in Scientific Reports
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Journal Article
Open access
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LSLaura Singh
Laura Singh
LSLaurent Schüpbach
Laurent Schüpbach
DMDominik A. Moser
Dominik A. Moser
RWRoland Wiest
Roland Wiest
EHErno J. Hermans
Erno J. Hermans
TATatjana Aue
Tatjana Aue
Optimism bias and positive attention bias are important features of healthy information processing. Recent findings suggest dynamic bidirectional optimism-attention interactions, but the underlying neural mechanisms remain to be identified. The current functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, therefore, investigated the neural mechanisms underlying causal effects of optimistic expectancies on attention. We hypothesized that expectancies guide attention to confirmatory evidence in the environment, with enhanced salience and executive control network (SN/ECN) activity for unexpected information. Moreover, based on previous findings, we anticipated optimistic expectancies to more strongly impact attention and SN/ECN activity than pessimistic expectancies. Expectancies were induced with visual cues in 50 participants; subsequent attention to reward and punishment was assessed in a visual search task. As hypothesized, cues shortened reaction times to expected information, and unexpected information enhanced SN/ECN activity. Notably, these effects were stronger for optimistic than pessimistic expectancy cues. Our findings suggest that optimistic expectancies involve particularly strong predictions of reward, causing automatic guidance of attention to reward and great surprise about unexpected punishment. Such great surprise may be counteracted by visual avoidance of the punishing evidence, as revealed by prior evidence, thereby reducing the need to update (over)optimistic reward expectancies.

23 March 2021 in Human Brain Mapping
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Journal Article
Open access
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DMDominik Andreas Moser
Dominik Andreas Moser
MDMihai Dricu
Mihai Dricu
RKRaviteja Kotikalapudi
Raviteja Kotikalapudi
GDGaelle Doucet
Gaelle Doucet
TATatjana Aue
Tatjana Aue
An optimism bias refers to the belief in good things happening to oneself in the future with a higher likelihood than is justified. Social optimism biases extend this concept to groups that one identifies with. Previous literature has found that both personal and social optimism biases are linked to brain structure and task‐related brain function. Less is known about whether optimism biases are also expressed in resting‐state functional connectivity (RSFC). Forty‐two participants completed questionnaires on dispositional personal optimism (which is not necessarily unjustified) and comparative optimism (i.e., whether we see our own future as being rosier than a comparison person's future) and underwent a resting‐state functional magnetic resonance imaging scan. They further undertook an imaginative soccer task in order to assess both their personal and social optimism bias. We tested associations of these data with RSFC within and between 13 networks, using sparse canonical correlation analyses (sCCAs). We found that the primary sCCA component was positively connected to personal and social optimism bias and negatively connected to dispositional personal pessimism. This component was associated with (a) reduced integration of the default mode network, (b) reduced integration of the central executive and salience networks, and (c) reduced segregation between the default mode network and the central executive network. Our finding that optimism biases are linked to RSFC indicates that they may be rooted in neurobiology that exists outside of concurrent tasks. This poses questions as to what the limits of the malleability of such biases may be.