To explain social learning without invoking the cognitively complex concept of imitation, many learning mechanisms have been proposed. Borrowing an idea used routinely in cognitive psychology, we argue that most of these alternatives can be subsumed under a single process, priming, in which input increases the activation of stored internal representations. Imitation itself has generally been seen as a “special faculty.” This has diverted much research towards the all-or-none question of whether an animal can imitate, with disappointingly inconclusive results. In the great apes, however, voluntary, learned behaviour is organized hierarchically. This means that imitation can occur at various levels, of which we single out two clearly distinct ones: the “action level,” a rather detailed and linear specification of sequential acts, and the “program level,” a broader description of subroutine structure and the hierarchical layout of a behavioural “program.” Program level imitation is a high-level, constructive mechanism, adapted for the efficient learning of complex skills and thus not evident in the simple manipulations used to test for imitation in the laboratory. As examples, we describe the food-preparation techniques of wild mountain gorillas and the imitative behaviour of orangutans undergoing “rehabilitation” to the wild. Representing and manipulating relations between objects seems to be one basic building block in their hierarchical programs. There is evidence that great apes suffer from a stricter capacity limit than humans in the hierarchical depth of planning. We re-interpret some chimpanzee behaviour previously described as “emulation” and suggest that all great apes may be able to imitate at the program level. Action level imitation is seldom observed in great ape skill learning, and may have a largely social role, even in humans.

Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common knowledge assumptions, enabling players to anticipate their co-players' strategies. Under these assumptions, disparate anomalies emerge. Instrumental rationality, conventionally interpreted, fails to explain intuitively obvious features of human interaction, yields predictions starkly at variance with experimental findings, and breaks down completely in certain cases. In particular, focal point selection in pure coordination games is inexplicable, though it is easily achieved in practice; the intuitively compelling payoff-dominance principle lacks rational justification; rationality in social dilemmas is self-defeating; a key solution concept for cooperative coalition games is frequently inapplicable; and rational choice in certain sequential games generates contradictions. In experiments, human players behave more cooperatively and receive higher payoffs than strict rationality would permit. Orthodox conceptions of rationality are evidently internally deficient and inadequate for explaining human interaction. Psychological game theory, based on nonstandard assumptions, is required to solve these problems, and some suggestions along these lines have already been put forward.

Using a self-administered questionnaire, 227 respondents rated service elements associated with a restaurant, retail store, or public transport company on several 5-point and 7-point rating scales. Least-squares regression showed that linear equations for estimating 7-point from 5-point and 5-point from 7-point ratings explained over 85% of the variance and fitted the data almost as well as higher-order polynomials and power functions. In a cross-validation on a new data set the proportion of variance explained fell to about 76%. Functionally inverse versions of the derived linear equations were calculated for the convenience of researchers and psychometricians.

Antimicrobial resistance is a global health threat, partly driven by inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions for acute medical patients in hospitals. To provide a systematic review of qualitative research on antibiotic prescribing decisions in hospitals worldwide, including broad-spectrum antibiotic use. A systematic search of qualitative research on antibiotic prescribing for adult hospital patients published between 2007 and 2017 was conducted. Drawing on the Health Belief Model, a framework synthesis was conducted to assess threat perceptions associated with antimicrobial resistance, and perceived benefits and barriers associated with antibiotic stewardship. The risk of antimicrobial resistance was generally perceived to be serious, but the abstract and long-term nature of its consequences led physicians to doubt personal susceptibility. While prescribers believed in the benefits of optimizing prescribing, the direct link between over-prescribing and antimicrobial resistance was questioned, and prescribers' behaviour change was frequently considered futile when fighting the complex problem of antimicrobial resistance. The salience of individual patient risks was a key barrier to more conservative prescribing. Physicians perceived broad-spectrum antibiotics to be effective and low risk; prescribing broad-spectrum antibiotics involved low cognitive demand and enabled physicians to manage patient expectations. Antibiotic prescribing decisions in low-income countries were shaped by a context of heightened uncertainty and risk due to poor microbiology and infection control services. When tackling antimicrobial resistance, the tensions between immediate individual risks and long-term collective risks need to be taken into account. Efforts to reduce diagnostic uncertainty and to change risk perceptions will be critical in shifting practice.

This experiment tested the hypothesis that depth of involvement in a magazine article is inversely related to subsequent recall and recognition of accompanying advertisements. Subjects read magazine articles interspersed with unfamiliar advertisements for common product types. Results showed that the more deeply the subjects were involved in the articles, the less they remembered about the accompanying advertisements. Articles about recipes were rated least interesting, enjoyable, and absorbing, and they elicited less attention and concentration from the readers than fiction and feature articles, but subjects who read the recipes remembered the advertisements best and subjects who read the fiction article remembered the advertisements worst.