Following the identification of the Omicron variant of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in late November 2021, governments worldwide took actions intended to minimise the impact of the new variant within their borders. Despite guidance from the WHO advising a risk-based approach, many rapidly implemented stringent policies focused on travel restrictions. In this paper, we capture 221 national-level travel policies issued during the 3 weeks following publicisation of the Omicron variant. We characterise policies based on whether they target travellers from specific countries or focus more broadly on enhanced screening, and explore differences in approaches at the regional level. We find that initial reactions almost universally focused on entry bans and flight suspensions from Southern Africa, and that policies continued to target travel from these countries even after community transmission of the Omicron variant was detected elsewhere in the world. While layered testing and quarantine requirements were implemented by some countries later in this 3-week period, these enhanced screening policies were rarely the first response. The timing and conditionality of quarantine and testing requirements were not coordinated between countries or regions, creating logistical complications and burdening travellers with costs. Overall, response measures were rarely tied to specific criteria or adapted to match the unique epidemiology of the new variant.

Guinea worm disease (GWD) is a neglected tropical disease that was targeted for eradication several decades ago because of its limited geographical distribution, predictable seasonality, straightforward diagnosis, and exclusive infection of humans. However, a growing body of evidence challenges this last attribute and suggests that GWD can affect both humans and animal populations. The One Health approach emphasizes the relatedness of human, animal, and environmental health. We reviewed epidemiological evidence that could support the utility of a One Health approach for GWD control in the six countries that have reported human GWD cases since 2015—Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, and South Sudan. Human GWD cases have dramatically declined, but recent years have seen a gradual increase in human case counts, cases in new geographies, and a rapidly growing number of animal infections. Taken together, these suggest a need for an adjusted approach for eradicating GWD using a framework rooted in One Health, dedicated to improving disease surveillance and in animals; pinpointing the dominant routes of infection in animals; elucidating the disease burden in animals; determining transmission risk factors among animals and from animals to humans; and identifying practical ways to foster horizontal and multidisciplinary approaches.

"Reaching the “Last Mile”: Fresh Approaches Needed for Guinea Worm Eradication" published on 07 Jul 2021 by The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene.

Following the identification of the Omicron variant of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in late November 2021, governments worldwide took actions intended to minimize the impact of the new variant within their borders. Despite guidance from the World Health Organization advising a risk-based approach, many rapidly implemented stringent policies focused on travel restrictions. In this paper, we capture 221 national-level travel policies issued during the three weeks following publicization of the Omicron variant. We characterize policies based upon whether they target travelers from specific countries or focus more broadly on enhanced screening, and explore differences in approaches at the regional level. We find that initial reactions almost universally focused on entry bans and flight suspensions from Southern Africa, and that policies continued to target travel from these countries even after community transmission of the Omicron variant was detected elsewhere in the world. While layered testing and quarantine requirements were implemented by some countries later in this three-week period, these enhanced screening policies were rarely the first response. The timing and conditionality of quarantine and testing requirements were not coordinated between countries or regions, creating logistical complications and burdening travelers with costs. Overall, response measures were rarely tied to specific criteria or adapted to match the unique epidemiology of the new variant. Summary box: During the initial three-week period following the discovery of the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant, nations rushed to implement travel restrictions - often at odds with guidance from the World Health Organization. By sourcing and cataloging initial national-level travel restrictions worldwide, we demonstrate how the distribution of entry bans, flight suspensions, quarantine measures, vaccination requirements, and testing protocols evolved in response to emerging information during a period of uncertainty. Countries that issued entry bans almost universally targeted the same Southern African countries and continued to do so even after widespread community transmission of the Omicron variant was reported elsewhere in the world. Layers of testing and quarantine requirements were added later during the observation period but were rarely the initial response, with the exception of restrictions issued by countries in Africa, where leading with enhanced screening measures was more common. Analysis of the disconnect between travel restrictions and transmission patterns that followed emergence of the Omicron variant provides a basis to inform evidence-based control measures for future virus mitigation efforts.