Tommaso Nannicini

Prof. Dr. Tommaso Nannicini


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 October 2012 in American Political Science Review
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FBFernanda Brollo
Fernanda Brollo
TNTommaso Nannicini
Tommaso Nannicini
This article uses a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to disclose purely political reasons in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil, and find that—in preelection years—municipalities in which the mayor is affiliated with the coalition (and especially with the political party) of the Brazilian president receive approximately one-third larger discretionary transfers for infrastructures. This effect is primarily driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next election.

1 February 2011 in American Political Science Review
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VGVincenzo Galasso
Vincenzo Galasso
TNTommaso Nannicini
Tommaso Nannicini
Is electoral competition good for political selection? To address this issue, we introduce a theoretical model where ideological parties select and allocate high-valence (experts) and low-valence (party loyalists) candidates into electoral districts. Voters care about a national policy (e.g., party ideology) and the valence of their district's candidates. High-valence candidates are more costly for the parties to recruit. We show that parties compete by selecting and allocating good politicians to the most contestable districts. Empirical evidence on Italian members of parliament confirms this prediction: politicians with higher ex ante quality, measured by years of schooling, previous market income, and local government experience, are more likely to run in contestable districts. Indeed, despite being different on average, politicians belonging to opposite political coalitions converge to high-quality levels in close electoral races. Furthermore, politicians elected in contestable districts have fewer absences in parliament, due to a selection effect more than to reelection incentives.

12 April 2013 in Journal of the European Economic Association
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SGStefano Gagliarducci
Stefano Gagliarducci
TNTommaso Nannicini
Tommaso Nannicini

16 February 2011 in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
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TNTommaso Nannicini
Tommaso Nannicini
ABAndreas Billmeier
Andreas Billmeier

23 April 2021 in American Journal of Political Science
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VGVincenzo Galasso
Vincenzo Galasso
TNTommaso Nannicini
Tommaso Nannicini
SNSalvatore Nunnari
Salvatore Nunnari
Negative advertising is frequent in electoral campaigns, despite its ambiguous effectiveness: Negativity may reduce voters' evaluation of the targeted politician but may have a backlash effect for the attacker. We study the effect of negative advertising in electoral races with more than two candidates with a large‐scale field experiment during an electoral campaign for mayor in Italy and a survey experiment in a fictitious mayoral campaign. In our field experiment, we find a strong, positive spillover effect on the third main candidate (neither the target nor the attacker). This effect is confirmed in our survey experiment, which creates a controlled environment with no ideological components or strategic voting. The negative ad has no impact on the targeted incumbent, has a sizable backlash effect on the attacker, and largely benefits the idle candidate. The attacker is perceived as less cooperative, less likely to lead a successful government, and more ideologically extreme.

2 September 2021 in International Tax and Public Finance
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LMLuigi Marattin
Luigi Marattin
TNTommaso Nannicini
Tommaso Nannicini
Francesco PorcelliFrancesco Porcelli
Francesco Porcelli
A growing literature emphasizes that the output effect of fiscal consolidation hinges on its composition, as the choice of increasing revenues vs cutting expenditure is not neutral. Existing studies, however, underscore the role of local governments in a federal setting. Indeed, transfer cuts at the central level might translate into higher local taxes, changing the effective composition of the fiscal adjustment. We evaluate this transmission mechanism in Italy, where municipalities below the threshold of 5,000 inhabitants were exempted from (large) transfer cuts in 2012. This allows us to implement a difference-in-discontinuities design in order to estimate the causal impact of transfer cuts on the composition of fiscal adjustment, also because tight fiscal rules impose a balanced budget on Italian municipalities. We find a pass-through mechanism by which local governments react to the contraction of intergovernmental grants by mainly increasing taxes rather than reducing spending. From a political economy perspective, this revenue based fiscal consolidation is driven by local governments with low electoral competition and low party fragmentation.