The dislocations of the worldwide economic crisis, the necessity of a system of global justice to address crimes against humanity, and the notorious 'democratic deficit' of international institutions highlight the need for an innovative and truly global legal system, one that permits humanity to re-order itself according to acknowledged global needs and evolving consciousness. A new global law will constitute, by itself, a genuine legal order and will not be limited to a handful of moral principles that attempt to guide the conduct of the world's peoples. If the law of nations served the hegemonic interests of Ancient Rome, and international law served those of the European nation-state, then a new global law will contribute to the common good of all humanity and, ideally, to the development of durable world peace. This volume offers a historical-juridical foundation for the development of this new global law.

Roman Law: An Introduction offers a clear and accessible introduction to Roman law for students of any legal tradition. In the thousand years between the Law of the Twelve Tables and Justinian’s massive Codification, the Romans developed the most sophisticated and comprehensive secular legal system of Antiquity, which remains at the heart of the civil law tradition of Europe, Latin America, and some countries of Asia and Africa. Roman lawyers created new legal concepts, ideas, rules, and mechanisms that most Western legal systems still apply. The study of Roman law thus facilitates understanding among people of different cultures by inspiring a kind of legal common sense and breadth of knowledge. Based on over twenty-five years’ experience teaching Roman law, this volume offers a comprehensive examination of the subject, as well as a historical introduction which contextualizes the Roman legal system for students who have no familiarity with Latin or knowledge of Roman history. More than a compilation of legal facts, the book captures the defining characteristics and principal achievements of Roman legal culture through a millennium of development.

The idea of solidarity is in vogue, especially since the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the term “solidarity,” as used in nursing, is imprecise and vague, lacking clear definition and connoting a variety of general meanings. Based on the original meaning of “solidarity” in ancient Roman law, this article captures the archetypical idea of solidarity from a historical and interdisciplinary perspective. This archetypical or primary meaning comes before the development of any other meanings of the word, and it is therefore authentic and genuine because it does not derive from something else. After establishing the archetypical meaning of solidarity, the article translates this meaning into the area of nursing and demonstrates a deep connectivity between healthcare and solidarity. The second part of the article offers and develops a new definition of nursing solidarity as the responsibility for the healthcare of a person (unit) shared as a whole (entirety) by that person and a nurse or a nursing team (plurality). This new definition has some implications for nursing practice and education, since the definition emphasizes the idea that solidarity helps to (a) foster respect and avoid discrimination, (b) promote cohesion in health communities, (c) increase individual responsibility and a spirit of service, (d) stimulate motivation, (e) improve communication, (f) create an engaging workplace, and (g) develop leadership.

This timely book offers a theistic approach to secular legal systems and demonstrates that these systems are neither agnostic nor atheist. Critical but succinct in its approach, this book focuses on an extensive range of liberal legal approaches to religious and moral issues and subjects them to critical scrutiny from a secular perspective. Expertly written by a leading scholar, the author offers a rare combination of profundity of ideas and simplicity of expression. It is a ringing defense of the theistic conception of secular legal systems and an uncompromising attack on the agnostic and atheist conception.

In this article, I explore potential connections between law and spirituality as well as some of the legal implications of these connections. After arguing that spirituality is conceptually autonomous from religion and morality, I explain why the spiritual triad of love, communion, and gift is deeply interconnected with the legal triad of justice, agreement, and right. I also make clear why individual and collective intentions and cultural values are the main channels of interaction between law and spirituality. In the second part of the article, I argue that legal systems evolve through spiritualization, among other ways, promoting the dematerialization of the legal system, encouraging the limitation of domination, inspiring the reduction of coercion, stimulating communion and consensus in society, or increasing respect for the law and the legal systems. Spiritualization demands a recognition of the higher dimension of the law and, therefore, helps rethink, reorient, renew, reform, and reimagine law and legal systems. Finally, I sketch a pattern of five levels to measure the degree of spiritualization of concrete legal systems. This pattern can also be applied to legal actors and institutions.

This essay develops a normative argument against Michael Perry’s approach to religious freedom. According to Perry, the right to religious freedom should be expanded into a claim upon liberal democracies to religious and moral freedom. In other words, one should be free to practice one’s morality, whether or not it is grounded in the transcendent. This paper argues instead that religious freedom cannot be protected by the same legal paradigm as moral freedom because religion and morality affect legal systems in different ways. Religious freedom and moral freedom are different ontological realities and therefore require different treatments under law. Religion is detachable from political communities; morality is not: political communities are by definition moral communities. Perry’s expansion promotes moral permissiveness and slows and hinders the right development of religious and moral values in political societies. His approach ultimately identifies moral freedom with free morality and coercively imposes a particular model of morality: namely, a liberal one. In place of Perry’s expansion, this paper proposes a new expansion of religious liberty along different lines: a more specific legal distinction between the “right to religion,” on the one hand, and moral freedom of conscience, on the other.