Public health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving the local government, the enterprises, and the public, for the public health emergency, e.g., COVID-19. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the tripartite evolutionary game are explored, and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for public health emergencies is also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that formulating reasonable subsidy measures, encouraging the participation of the public, and enforcing the punishment to enterprises for their negative behaviors can prompt three parties to cooperate in fighting against the epidemic. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the public health emergency and provides theoretical support for the local government and related participants to make proper decisions in public health emergencies.

This paper uses the super-efficiency SBM model to measure the green economic efficiency considering undesired output and analyzes the spatial distribution difference of green economic efficiency; secondly, the nonlinear panel threshold model is used to empirically study the nonlinear relationship between environmental regulations and green economic efficiency, and further analyzed the threshold effect of environmental regulations on the efficiency of green economy and concluded as follows. (1) The green economy efficiency index in the eastern region is mostly more significant than 1, and the green economy efficiency in most provinces in the eastern region has improved. These provinces have higher regional production levels and less environmental pollution. The green economy efficiency of the central region is second only to the eastern region. The green economy efficiency of provinces in the western region except Chongqing is less than 1, indicating that these provinces have insufficient regional production, severe environmental pollution, or extensive resource depletion. (2) The impact of environmental regulations on the efficiency of the green economy presents an inverted “U” shape, with a threshold of 0.5128 for environmental regulations. The impact of the industrial structure on the efficiency of the green economy changes from inhibition to promotion after crossing the threshold of the intensity of environmental regulation, and the degree of opening to the outside world has a complementary effect on the efficiency of the green economy. The impact of urbanization on the efficiency of the green economy changes from promotion to suppression after surpassing the threshold of the intensity of environmental regulations.