This paper shows how green investing spurs companies to mitigate their carbon emissions by raising the cost of capital of the most carbon-intensive companies. Companies’ emissions decrease when the wealth share of green investors and their sensitivity to climate externalities increase. We show that the impact of green investors primarily governs companies’ long-run emissions. Companies are further incentivized to reduce their emissions when green investors anticipate tighter climate regulations and climate-related technological innovations. However, heightened uncertainty regarding future climate risks alleviates green investors’ pressure on the cost of capital of companies and pushes them to increase their emissions. Calibrated on U.S. data, our model suggests that, albeit effective, the impact of green investors remains limited given their current wealth share and practices. This paper was accepted by George Serafeim, Special Section of Management Science on Business and Climate Change. Funding: This work was supported by the Europlace Institute of Finance. T. De Angelis received funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council [Grant EP/R021201/1], and P. Tankov received funding from the Finance for Energy Markets research initiative of the Institut Europlace de Finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4472 .
We develop a model for the industry dynamics in the electricity market, based on mean-field games of optimal stopping. In our model, there are two types of agents: the renewable producers and the conventional producers. The renewable producers choose the optimal moment to build new renewable plants, and the conventional producers choose the optimal moment to exit the market. The agents interact through the market price, determined by matching the aggregate supply of the two types of producers with an exogenous demand function. Using a relaxed formulation of optimal stopping mean-field games, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of the equilibrium price process. An empirical example, inspired by the UK electricity market is presented. The example shows that while renewable subsidies clearly lead to higher renewable penetration, this may entail a cost to the consumer in terms of higher peakload prices. In order to avoid rising prices, the renewable subsidies must be combined with mechanisms ensuring that sufficient conventional capacity remains in place to meet the energy demand during peak periods.
Improved bounds on the copula of a bivariate random vector are computed when partial information is available, such as the values of the copula on a given subset of [0, 1]2, or the value of a functional of the copula, monotone with respect to the concordance order. These results are then used to compute model-free bounds on the prices of two-asset options which make use of extra information about the dependence structure, such as the price of another two-asset option.