Gregorio Serna

Dr. Gregorio Serna

Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Alcalá. Plaza de la Victoria, 2, Alcalá de Henares, 28802 Madrid, Spain
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

28Years (1999-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2005 in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
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Journal Article
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ÁLÁngel León
Ángel León
GRGonzalo Rubio
Gonzalo Rubio
Gregorio SernaGregorio Serna
Gregorio Serna

1 August 1999 in Journal of Banking & Finance
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Journal Article
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IPIgnacio Peña
Ignacio Peña
GRGonzalo Rubio
Gonzalo Rubio
Gregorio SernaGregorio Serna
Gregorio Serna
We report simple regressions and Granger causality tests in order to understand the pattern of implied volatilities across exercise prices. We employ all calls and puts transacted between 16:00 and 16:45 on the Spanish IBEX-35 index from January 1994 to April 1996. Transaction costs, proxied by the bid–ask spread, seem to be a key determinant of the curvature of the volatility smile. Moreover, time to expiration, the uncertainty associated with the market and the relative market momentum are also important variables in explaining the smile.Publicad

18 May 2012 in European Financial Management
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Journal Article
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AMAndrés García Mirantes
Andrés García Mirantes
FGFrancisco Javier Población García
Francisco Javier Población García
Gregorio SernaGregorio Serna
Gregorio Serna

1 November 2013 in Energy Economics
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Journal Article
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AMAndrés García Mirantes
Andrés García Mirantes
FGFrancisco Javier Población García
Francisco Javier Población García
Gregorio SernaGregorio Serna
Gregorio Serna

1 September 2001 in European Financial Management
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JPJuan Ignacio Peña
Juan Ignacio Peña
GRGonzalo Rubio
Gonzalo Rubio
Gregorio SernaGregorio Serna
Gregorio Serna
Given the evidence provided by Longstaff (1995), and Peña, Rubio and Serna (1999) a serious candidate to explain the pronounced pattern of volatility estimates across exercise prices might be related to liquidity costs. Using all calls and puts transacted between 16:00 and 16:45 on the Spanish IBEX‐35 index futures from January 1994 to October 1998 we extend previous papers to study the influence of liquidity costs, as proxied by the relative bid‐ask spread, on the pricing of options. Surprisingly, alternative parametric option pricing models incorporating the bid‐ask spread seem to perform poorly relative to Black‐Scholes.

17 November 2020 in Mathematics
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Iván de la FuenteIván de la Fuente
Iván de la Fuente
ENEliseo Navarro
Eliseo Navarro
Gregorio SernaGregorio Serna
Gregorio Serna
In this study, we analyzed the risk faced by the reverse mortgage provider in the case of the lump-sum solution, which is increasingly becoming one of the most popular types of reverse mortgages. The risk faced by the mortgage provider was estimated by means of a value at risk (VaR) procedure that involves a Monte Carlo simulation method and an ARMA-EGARCH assumption for modeling house price returns in the United Kingdom from 1952 to 2019. The results showed that the reverse mortgage provider faced higher risk and consequently needed to allocate more funds to meet its regulatory capital requirements in the case of relatively young borrowers, especially when they reached their life expectancy and had high roll-up rates. The risk was even higher in the case of the female population. Furthermore, care must be taken when the rental yield rate is higher than the risk-free rate, as is currently the case, as the value of the no-negative-equity guarantee (NNEG) is relatively high and results in higher value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) values. These results have important implications in terms of policy decision making when determining the countercyclical buffer for reverse mortgages in Basel III, as well as from a managerial perspective when determining the economic capital needed to support the risk taken by the lender.