Increasing the well-being of migrant workers is one of the key objectives of promoting equality and safe, people-oriented, and sustainable social development, as well as inclusive globalization. With the equalization reform of the public health system and the reduction of frictions between cities, the well-being of the sense of gain to public health service (SGPHS) of migrant workers has attracted widespread attention. Based on the migrant worker thematic survey data in 2017 and the city statistical data in six destination cities, this study constructed and measured the sense of gain to public health service index and city public service distance index, and then studied the effects of city public service distance on the SGPHS of migrant workers and the heterogeneous effect. The results showed that the SGPHS of Chinese migrant workers is at a moderate level and presents spatial differences. Under the dual mechanism of preference reinforcement effect and public service discount effect, the effect of city public service distance on the SGPHS of migrant works shows an inverted U-shaped relationship, and the results of the endogeneity test by the generalized propensity score matching model are robust. The city public service distance has a significant non-linear effect on the public health service accessibility and provision for migrant workers, as well as on second-generation, low-income migrant workers, and migrant workers in central and western regions. The results provide beneficial insights for the formulation of rational public service policies.

In recent years, payment schemes in healthcare have garnered attention for their potential impact on service delivery and cost management. This paper explores the impact of the bundled payment scheme (BP) on hospital outpatient services, focusing on the cost–speed tradeoff. Specifically, a higher service rate increases patient demand but also raises medical costs. We consider a queueing-game theoretical model to analyze servers’ service rate behaviors under different payment schemes (fee-for-service and BP) and the payer’s optimal payment scheme setting. Our study shows that achieving the first-best outcome under centralized decision making using the BP requires specific conditions. When the medical budget is sufficiently high, the payer can guide hospitals toward the first-best decision by setting an optimal price under the BP. However, when the budget is at an intermediate level, hospitals may set slower equilibrium service rates to control costs. To address this issue, the payer can implement service level regulation based on the BP scheme to achieve the first-best outcome. This scheme encourages hospitals to choose higher service rates by limiting expected waiting times. When the budget is too low, hospitals may be unwilling to provide service due to unprofitability. Moreover, as competition between hospitals intensifies, it becomes easier to maximize social welfare under the BP scheme.