Duncan Pritchard

Duncan Pritchard


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
10 March 2005
Verified
Book
Closed access
DPDuncan Pritchard
Duncan Pritchard
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.

1 January 2012 in The Journal of Philosophy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DPDuncan Pritchard
Duncan Pritchard

10 October 2006 in Synthese
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DPDuncan Pritchard
Duncan Pritchard

6 September 2012
Verified
Book
Closed access
DPDuncan Pritchard
Duncan Pritchard
This book offers a defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief which enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). This account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. The aim of the book is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, it is argued that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism.

1 January 2004 in Journal of Philosophical Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DPDuncan Pritchard
Duncan Pritchard
PCPhilosophy Documentation Center
Philosophy Documentation Center

27 May 2009 in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DPDuncan Pritchard
Duncan Pritchard