Gualtiero Piccinini

Dr. Gualtiero Piccinini

Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri – St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63121, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 March 2011 in Synthese
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GPGualtiero Piccinini
Gualtiero Piccinini
CCCarl Craver
Carl Craver

5 November 2012 in Cognitive Science
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GPGualtiero Piccinini
Gualtiero Piccinini
SBSonya Bahar
Sonya Bahar
We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism—neural processes are computations in the generic sense. After that, we reject on empirical grounds the common assimilation of neural computation to either analog or digital computation, concluding that neural computation is sui generis. Analog computation requires continuous signals; digital computation requires strings of digits. But current neuroscientific evidence indicates that typical neural signals, such as spike trains, are graded like continuous signals but are constituted by discrete functional elements (spikes); thus, typical neural signals are neither continuous signals nor strings of digits. It follows that neural computation is sui generis. Finally, we highlight three important consequences of a proper understanding of neural computation for the theory of cognition. First, understanding neural computation requires a specially designed mathematical theory (or theories) rather than the mathematical theories of analog or digital computation. Second, several popular views about neural computation turn out to be incorrect. Third, computational theories of cognition that rely on non‐neural notions of computation ought to be replaced or reinterpreted in terms of neural computation.

19 August 2010 in Journal of Biological Physics
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GPGualtiero Piccinini
Gualtiero Piccinini
ASAndrea Scarantino
Andrea Scarantino

10 June 2015 in Synthese
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WBWorth Boone
Worth Boone
GPGualtiero Piccinini
Gualtiero Piccinini

1 October 2007 in Philosophy of Science
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GPGualtiero Piccinini
Gualtiero Piccinini
This paper offers an account of what it is for a physical system to be a computing mechanism—a system that performs computations. A computing mechanism is a mechanism whose function is to generate output strings from input strings and (possibly) internal states, in accordance with a general rule that applies to all relevant strings and depends on the input strings and (possibly) internal states for its application. This account is motivated by reasons endogenous to the philosophy of computing, namely, doing justice to the practices of computer scientists and computability theorists. It is also an application of recent literature on mechanisms, because it assimilates computational explanation to mechanistic explanation. The account can be used to individuate computing mechanisms and the functions they compute and to taxonomize computing mechanisms based on their computing power.

21 September 2006 in Philosophical Studies
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GPGualtiero Piccinini
Gualtiero Piccinini