This page has only limited features, please log in for full access.
Agents invest their available time in projects that generate profit. A mechanism divides the profit generated between these agents, depending on their allocation of time and the total profit of every project. We study mechanisms that incentivize agents to contribute their time to a level that results in the maximal aggregate profit at the strong Nash equilibrium (coalitional efficiency). Our finding is the characterization of all mechanisms that satisfy coalitional efficiency. These mechanisms depends on the type of available projects, their interconnectedness and expand earlier mechanisms that are non-bossy.
Ruben Juarez; Kohei Nitta; Miguel Vargas. Coalitional efficient profit-sharing. Economics Letters 2021, 204, 109875 .
AMA StyleRuben Juarez, Kohei Nitta, Miguel Vargas. Coalitional efficient profit-sharing. Economics Letters. 2021; 204 ():109875.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRuben Juarez; Kohei Nitta; Miguel Vargas. 2021. "Coalitional efficient profit-sharing." Economics Letters 204, no. : 109875.
Recent research has shown that there is a correlation between the circular economy (CE) and Industry 4.0 (I4.0). In addition, other research papers have analyzed the way that CE uses the different I4.0 technologies to transfer from the existing linear economy to CE; however, there are still gaps in the literature regarding the challenges and impacts that society and individuals must face to be ready for the transition from a linear to a circular economy. These challenges seek to guarantee the sustainability and sustainable development of the different business models that mobilize products and services through supply chains. Here, we conducted a review and compilation of the latest bibliography of circular economy and Industry 4.0 theory. The objective of this work is to present the evolutionary relationship between CE and I4.0, as well as its multi-step model of analysis. This research is relevant because its topics are timely and pertinent, especially for academics. Further, at the time that this research was performed, none of the countries were concerned about the impact that technological changes have on the human being and on society, and up to now we do not currently have studies that show how people are being trained to face the transition from the linear economy, which is common in most societies, toward a CE.
Carlos Tavera Romero; Diego Castro; Jesús Ortiz; Osamah Khalaf; Miguel Vargas. Synergy between Circular Economy and Industry 4.0: A Literature Review. Sustainability 2021, 13, 4331 .
AMA StyleCarlos Tavera Romero, Diego Castro, Jesús Ortiz, Osamah Khalaf, Miguel Vargas. Synergy between Circular Economy and Industry 4.0: A Literature Review. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (8):4331.
Chicago/Turabian StyleCarlos Tavera Romero; Diego Castro; Jesús Ortiz; Osamah Khalaf; Miguel Vargas. 2021. "Synergy between Circular Economy and Industry 4.0: A Literature Review." Sustainability 13, no. 8: 4331.
Agents are endowed with time, which in turn is invested in projects that generate profit. A mechanism divides the profit generated by these agents depending on the allocation of time as well as the amount of profit made by every project. We study mechanisms that incentivize agents to contribute their time to a level that results in the maximal aggregate profit at the Nash equilibrium, regardless of the production functions involved (efficiency). Our main finding involves the characterization of all mechanisms that satisfy efficiency. Furthermore, within this class, we characterize the mechanisms that are monotone on the addition of time to agents as well as those monotone on the payoffs of the agents with respect to technological improvements in the generation of profit. The class of efficient mechanisms depends on the type of available projects and their connectedness. It expands earlier profit-sharing mechanisms that are independent of profit generation.
Ruben Juarez; Kohei Nitta; Miguel Vargas. Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation. Economic Theory 2019, 70, 817 -846.
AMA StyleRuben Juarez, Kohei Nitta, Miguel Vargas. Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation. Economic Theory. 2019; 70 (3):817-846.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRuben Juarez; Kohei Nitta; Miguel Vargas. 2019. "Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation." Economic Theory 70, no. 3: 817-846.
Francisco Sánchez-Sánchez; Miguel Vargas-Valencia. Games with nested constraints given by a level structure. Journal of Dynamics & Games 2018, 5, 95 -107.
AMA StyleFrancisco Sánchez-Sánchez, Miguel Vargas-Valencia. Games with nested constraints given by a level structure. Journal of Dynamics & Games. 2018; 5 (2):95-107.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFrancisco Sánchez-Sánchez; Miguel Vargas-Valencia. 2018. "Games with nested constraints given by a level structure." Journal of Dynamics & Games 5, no. 2: 95-107.