The permanence of land management practices adopted under agri-environmental schemes (AESs) is often questioned. This paper investigates the drivers of farmers’ decisions as to whether to maintain “proenvironment” practices beyond the duration of a contract, and in particular the effect of social norms. Our results, based on the stated intentions of 395 French farmers, show that both pecuniary and nonpecuniary motivations drive farmers’ decisions, which are also significantly influenced by information about a social norm. Therefore “nudging” farmers, by conveying information to them on other farmers’ proenvironmental practices, appears to be a means of maintaining the long-run benefits of AESs. (JEL Q18, Q28)

We test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behaviour among farmers as a complement to traditional CAP measures. We conducted a randomised controlled trial among 200 farmers equipped with irrigation smart meters in South-West France. Treated farmers received weekly information on individual and group water consumption over four months. Our results rule out medium to large effect-sizes of the nudge. Moreover, they suggest that the nudge was effective at reducing the consumption of those who irrigate the most, although it appears to have reduced the proportion of those who do not consume water at all.