Making morally sensitive decisions and evaluations pervade many human everyday activities. Philosophers, economists, psychologists and behavioural scientists researching such decision-making typically explore the principles, processes and predictors that constitute human moral decision-making. Crucially, very little research has explored the theoretical and methodological development (supported by empirical evidence) of utilitarian theories of moral decision-making. Accordingly, in this critical review article, we invite the reader on a moral journey from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism to the veil of ignorance reasoning, via a recent theoretical proposal emphasising utilitarian moral behaviour—perspective-taking accessibility (PT accessibility). PT accessibility research revealed that providing participants with access to all situational perspectives in moral scenarios, eliminates (previously reported in the literature) inconsistency between their moral judgements and choices. Moreover, in contrast to any previous theoretical and methodological accounts, moral scenarios/tasks with full PT accessibility provide the participants with unbiased even odds (neither risk averse nor risk seeking) and impartiality. We conclude that the proposed by Martin et al. PT Accessibility (a new type of veil of ignorance with even odds that do not trigger self-interest, risk related preferences or decision biases) is necessary in order to measure humans’ prosocial utilitarian behaviour and promote its societal benefits.

Problem gambling is a gambling disorder often described as continued gambling in the face of increasing losses. In this article, we explored problem gambling behaviour and its psychological determinants. We considered the assumption of stability in risky preferences, anticipated by both normative and descriptive theories of decision making, as well as recent evidence that risk preferences are in fact ‘constructed on the fly’ during risk elicitation. Accordingly, we argue that problem gambling is a multifaceted disorder, which is ‘fueled on the fly’ by a wide range of contextual and non-contextual influences, including individual differences in personality traits, hormonal and emotional activations. We have proposed that the experience of gambling behaviour in itself is a dynamic experience of events in time series, where gamblers anchor on the most recent event—typically a small loss or rare win. This is a highly adaptive, but erroneous, decision-making mechanism, where anchoring on the most recent event alters the psychological representations of substantial and accumulated loss in the past to a representation of negligible loss. In other words, people feel better while they gamble. We conclude that problem gambling researchers and policy makers will need to employ multifaceted and holistic approaches to understand problem gambling.

Intertemporal choices are very prevalent in daily life, ranging from simple, mundane decisions to highly consequential decisions. In this context, thinking about the future and making sound decisions are crucial to promoting mental and physical health, as well as a financially sustainable lifestyle. In the present study, we set out to investigate some of the possible underlying mechanisms, such as cognitive factors and emotional states, that promote future-oriented decisions. In a cross-sectional experimental study, we used a gain and a loss version of an intertemporal monetary choices task. Our main behavioural result indicated that people are substantially more impulsive over smaller and sooner monetary losses compared to equivalent gains. In addition, for both decisional domains, significant individual difference predictors emerged, indicating that intertemporal choices are sensitive to the affective and cognitive parameters. By focusing on the cognitive and emotional individual factors that influence impulsive decisions, our study could constitute a building block for successful future intervention programs targeted at mental and physical health issues, including gambling behaviour.

No prior behavioral science research has delved into the impact of gamble presentation (horizontal or vertical) on individuals’ utilitarian behavior, despite evidence suggesting that such choices can be influenced by comparing attributes like probability and money in gambles. This article addresses this gap by exploring the influence of gamble presentation on utilitarian behavior. A two-factor independent measures design was employed to explore the influence of the type of gamble presentation and age on participants’ utilitarian decision-making preferences. The findings showed a reduced likelihood of participants choosing the non-utilitarian gamble with vertically presented gambles compared to horizontal ones. Consequently, participants’ utilitarian behavior was influenced by between-gamble comparisons of available attributes, with utilitarian choices (e.g., choosing Gamble A) being more prevalent in vertical presentations due to a straightforward comparison on the probability attribute. Furthermore, the results also revealed that older participants take more time than their younger counterparts when making utilitarian errors. We attribute this to their abundant knowledge and experience. Future research should explore the comparative psychological processing used by participants in risky decision-making tasks.

Behavioral science research indicates that people appear to construct their risk preferences 'on the fly', informed by decision making context and task (Kusev et al., 2020). However, very little research has explored people's psychological processing during decision-making 'on the fly'. Accordingly, in this article we propose, explore, and establish the First Attribute Heuristic (FAH) in the domain of risky decision-making. FAH is a simple decision-making heuristic which is based on binary comparisons of values on the first contextually available attribute (e.g., probability or money). In three studies we found that the participants' preference and likelihood of selecting the option with the dominant value over the option with the inferior value increase, when these values are presented on the first contextually available attribute. Importantly, our experimental findings provide further evidence that participants' risk preferences are constructed 'on the fly'. Specifically, decision-makers use FAH (a simple decision-making heuristic), which contributes to the lability of their preferences. Importantly, this heuristic and its influence on human risky decision-making are not anticipated by well-established behavioral theories such as Expected Utility Theory, Prospect Theory, and the Priority Heuristic.