Grigory Pishchulov

Dr. Grigory Pishchulov

Alliance Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester, Manchester M15 6PB, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2019 in International Journal of Production Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Grigory PishchulovGrigory Pishchulov
Grigory Pishchulov
ATAlexander Trautrims
Alexander Trautrims
TCThomas Chesney
Thomas Chesney
SGStefan Gold
Stefan Gold
LSLeila Schwab
Leila Schwab

1 June 2016 in Journal of World Business
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HTHeinz Tüselmann
Heinz Tüselmann
Rudolf R. SinkovicsRudolf R. Sinkovics
Rudolf R. Sinkovics
Grigory PishchulovGrigory Pishchulov
Grigory Pishchulov


1 February 2021 in Computers in Industry
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SCSonia Cisneros-Cabrera
Sonia Cisneros-Cabrera
Grigory PishchulovGrigory Pishchulov
Grigory Pishchulov
PSPedro Sampaio
Pedro Sampaio
NMNikolay Mehandjiev
Nikolay Mehandjiev
ZLZixu Liu
Zixu Liu
SKSophia Kununka
Sophia Kununka

1 April 2019 in Journal of World Business
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SGSougand Golesorkhi
Sougand Golesorkhi
RMRoy Mersland
Roy Mersland
RPRebecca Piekkari
Rebecca Piekkari
Grigory PishchulovGrigory Pishchulov
Grigory Pishchulov
TRTrond Randøy
Trond Randøy

7 May 2022 in Annals of Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Grigory PishchulovGrigory Pishchulov
Grigory Pishchulov
KRKnut Richter
Knut Richter
SGSougand Golesorkhi
Sougand Golesorkhi
Supply chain contracting is known to suffer from inefficiency in the presence of asymmetric information. Full vertical integration would eliminate the informational inefficiency but can be strategically undesirable. Yet today’s supply chain partnerships exhibit a certain degree of partial vertical integration via equity ties between the firms. Such governance forms received limited attention in supply chain research. Management literature suggests that partial vertical integration may help the firms to ease contracting problems by aligning their incentives, and thus improve the total surplus. We address this proposition by studying a model of a partially integrated supply chain in which the buyer holds an equity stake in the supplier. We adopt an operational perspective and investigate contracting between the firms within the joint economic lot size framework. We demonstrate that in this classical setting, partial integration can in fact be sufficient for eliminating informational inefficiency and achieving coordination. However, contrary to what one may expect, a tighter integration may harm supply chain performance and defeat coordination. We explain the underlying mechanism and investigate it analytically and numerically. Our results characterize sensitivity of supply chain performance to the degree of integration and stress the importance of the operational planning perspective for strategic decision making.