The high-quality development of the manufacturing industry is not only a requirement of industrial transformation and upgrading but also an internal task for the sustainable development of manufacturing enterprises. The high-quality development of the manufacturing industry is a process of multi-participation and dynamic evolution. To understand the evolution of the high-quality development of the manufacturing industry, an evolutionary game model composed of local governments, leading enterprises, and following enterprises is constructed. The evolution process and the influence of internal factors such as innovation capability, organization construction and industry resources on the evolution and stability strategy are analysed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulations. The results show that (1) there are two possible evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) models in the game, namely, {active supervision, positive participation, positive participation} and {active supervision, negative participation, negative participation}; (2) when the initial probabilities of leading and following enterprises are all at low levels, increasing any one of the local government's initial probability, innovation capability, organization construction and industry resources can promote tripartite evolution towards {active supervision, positive participation, positive participation}; and (3) the convergence rate of leading enterprises and following enterprises evolving towards a positive participation strategy will increase slightly with an increase in local government's initial probability, innovation capability, organization construction, and industry resources when both are at middle initial probability levels. The final policy suggestions can be used to help all parties choose the optimal strategy and to achieve the high-quality development target of the manufacturing industry as soon as possible.

Driven by the servicing and digital transformation of manufacturing enterprises, product and service innovation for manufacturers and service providers to promote integrated solutions collaboratively has become an important way for enterprises to maintain market competitiveness. Building on this foundation, this paper develops an innovation priority decision model for the product–service supply chain, which comprises manufacturers and service providers, considering the data mining and information sharing strategies of service providers. It analyzes the optimal decisions and profits of the members when product innovation is prioritized as well as when service innovation is prioritized, and subsequently explores the selection of innovation strategies for the product–service supply chain under varying conditions. The results of the study show that, firstly, service providers’ data mining and information sharing strategies are not always favorable to the innovation decisions of both parties. Only when data resources can be transformed into real innovation value at a reasonable cost can data mining and information sharing play the role of ‘external incentives’ to promote collaborative innovation between the two parties. Secondly, when service providers do not adopt data mining and information sharing strategies, the efficiency of product and service innovation plays a decisive role in innovation prioritization. The party with high innovation efficiency adopts the sub-priority innovation strategy, which can lead to a larger market share for the innovation results. Finally, under the service provider’s data mining and information sharing strategy, the innovation priority selection of the product–service supply chain depends on the information value transformation ability of the manufacturer and the service provider. Moreover, the profits of manufacturers and service providers under the same innovation priority do not always ‘advance or retreat together’, and there may be cases where one of them suffers a loss of profits. This study provides a theoretical basis for the choice of innovation strategies given to manufacturers and service providers, and promotes the development of collaborative innovation between them.

High-quality development highlights the importance of environmental protection and green low-carbon development. The high-quality development of the manufacturing industry is not only the key content for achieving green transformation, but also an important cornerstone for building a modern national industrial system. Current research focuses on companies and governments, ignoring the important value of suppliers and consumers. As a result, existing mechanisms have failed to deliver the desired results. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving manufacturing enterprises, local governments, suppliers, and consumers, and systematically analyzes the strategy selection process of the four participating populations. On this basis, the impact of exogenous and endogenous factors on the evolutionarily stable strategy is studied at the microscopic level using numerical simulation methods. The results show that (1) increasing any of the endogenous factors, such as innovative capability, organization building, and industrial resources, can accelerate the evolution of manufacturing enterprises evolve to smart upgrade strategy. (2) Increasing any one of the exogenous factors, such as policy environment, industrial cooperation, and market demand, can accelerate the rate at which manufacturing enterprises choose to adopt the strategy of smart upgrade. The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical reference for the behavioral strategies of manufacturing enterprises, and to provide a realistic reference for local governments to build a mechanism to promote the high-quality development of the manufacturing industry.