Stimulated by the recent debate on gender roles and men's fertility behaviour (Puur et al. 2008; Westff and Higgins 2009; Goldscheider, Olah and Puur 2010), we present evidence from Finland as a country well into the second phase of the so-called gender revolution. We examine how gender role attitudes relate to childbearing intentions at the onset of family life, intentions to have many (3 or more) children, and high personal fertility ideals among low-parity men and women. Gender equality attitudes are measured for both the public and the domestic sphere and the influence of work and family orientation is controlled for. Finding signs of a U-shaped association among men, we conclude that both traditional and egalitarian attitudes raise men's expected fertility compared to men with intermediate gender attitudes and independently of family values. Among Finnish women the impact of gender attitudes is smaller and more ambiguous
As one of the world’s two population ‘billionaires’, the future of China’s population is truly of global significance. With its very low fertility and a rapidly ageing population, it might appear that the country’s famous (or notorious) family planning restrictions are somewhat anachronistic. Here, we explore the process of reform seen over the past three decades and, most recently, in late 2013. We suggest that the popular notion that the family planning restrictions are acting as a pressure valve suppressing a pent-up demand for childbearing, particularly in rural China, is likely to be inaccurate. We also suggest that further reform of the restrictions will not solve the problems of population ageing or many of the other issues widely associated with the restrictions. We conclude that the prospects for further reform are wide-ranging, but likely to be beset by many challenges.
Stuart Gietel-Basten, Anna Rotkirch, and Tomáš Sobotka argue that policies responding to population decline and ageing should enable reproductive choice and maximise the potential of all citizens
In November 2013, China announced reforms to its family planning policies whereby couples would be allowed to have a second child if either parent is an only child. The announcement garnered worldwide media coverage, and stimulated academic and popular discussion. We explore the context of the 2013 reforms, including the economic, demographic, and political motivations behind them, and speculate on their likely effect. Noting that the impact of the reforms on China's long‐term demographic future is likely to be relatively slight, we consider why more radical reform may have been difficult to implement. We offer observations about possible future directions for Chinese family planning policies and explore the notion of “local pronatalism within nationally prescribed antinatalist limits” and how this suggests that an ideological shift within China's family planning apparatus may be plausible.
27 September 2021 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Significance: China has the world’s largest national population and is rapidly catching up with the United States in terms of having the status as the world's largest economy. In this context, recent reports about unexpectedly low levels of fertility have given rise to speculation that the resulting population stagnation/decline and rapid aging may pose a major obstacle to continued prosperity in the future. We show that, depending on the indicator of demographic dependency used, the future may look very different. When associated with rapid increases in human capital, low fertility rates may not pose such a significant obstacle to continued development over the coming decades. Whether this will be the case may have profound geopolitical and global economic consequences.
There are currently around a million Chinese households where the only child has died and the mother is beyond reproductive age. The number of such bereaved parents, known as shidu fumu, is forecast to increase to over 11 million by 2050. Using a sample survey conducted in 2013 in Shaanxi Province, the article explores the vulnerability of shidu fumu by various measures of well-being. Such parents are more vulnerable than nonbereaved parents in every respect. There are also significant differences in well-being between shidu fumu due to parental characteristics. We argue that policies supporting shidu fumu should be strengthened.