Ngo Long

Ngo Long


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

43Years (1984-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 November 2000
Verified
Book
Closed access
EDEngelbert J. Dockner
Engelbert J. Dockner
SJSteffen Jorgensen
Steffen Jorgensen
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GSGerhard Sorger
Gerhard Sorger
A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.

8 September 2010 in Dynamic Games and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
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1 May 2014 in Energy Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Rupert Quentin GraftonRupert Quentin Grafton
Rupert Quentin Grafton
TKTom Kompas
Tom Kompas
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HTHang To
Hang To

1 February 2003 in Journal of Population Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RRR. Rees
R. Rees
JKJohn Komlos
John Komlos
UWUlrich Woitek
Ulrich Woitek
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Ngo Long

1 February 2006 in Environment and Development Economics
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RCRobert Cairns
Robert Cairns
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Ngo Long
We solve directly a general maximin (sustainment, intergenerational-equity) problem. Because the shadow values of a maximin problem do not correspond to the shadow values from a general discounted-utility solution, they correspond to the prices of only a very special competitive economy. Virtual discount factors for the economy arise. They do not correspond to hyperbolic discount factors. Hartwick's rule is derived and generalized naturally to take into account non-autonomous and non-deterministic features of the economy. Under uncertainty, Hartwick's rule is the analytic expression of a form of precautionary principle. Hotelling's rule is a necessary condition, but may be more complex than has been appreciated in simple models. Some interpretations of strong sustainment are special cases of weak sustainment but, paradoxically, may be more difficult to solve.

10 July 2013 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
PAPatricia Apps
Patricia Apps
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RRRay Rees
Ray Rees