Smart vehicle applications play a crucial role in intelligent transportation systems, enabling sensor-equipped vehicles to establish dynamic networks for efficient collection, sharing, and aggregation. This significantly enhances road security and efficiency by transmitting crucial information to traffic authorities. However, partial research on certificateless aggregation signcryption (CLAS) scheme reveals an intriguing phenomenon where each proposed scheme consistently exhibits numerous security vulnerabilities, particularly susceptible to public key replacement attacks. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a blockchain-assisted certificateless aggregation sign-cryption scheme (BACLAS), leveraging blockchain technology to securely store users’ public key on a distributed ledger and prevent public key replacement attacks effectively. Furthermore, it is a provably secure communication scheme for real-world Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication while addressing practical security concerns. The BACLAS scheme ensures security in terms of existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) and indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) based on the hardness assumption of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model. The proposed scheme effectively reduces computational costs and time consumption, resulting in a significant reduction of the computation burden ranging from 50.02% to 88.28% compared to other competitive schemes. Moreover, it successfully addresses the key-escrow problem, thereby achieving enhanced security properties.

Nowadays, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are used in various fields due to their high maneuverability and low cost of construction and use. With the development of UAV technology, it has become a trend for UAVs to cooperate with each other to complete assigned tasks. Multiple UAVs are combined according to a certain structure, and through the information sharing between them, a cooperative effect is generated to achieve intelligent collaborative task execution. However, information sharing is carried out on a public channel, so ensuring secure communication between UAVs is crucial. Moreover, UAVs are easily captured by an adversary, who can impersonate legitimate UAVs to disrupt communications if UAVs’ internal secrets that are stolen. Therefore, we propose a lightweight authentication scheme based on physical unclonable function (PUF), to provide mutual authentication between UAVs. PUF is embedded in the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to defend against physical capture attack. Furthermore, to evaluate the security and performance of our scheme, formal and informal security analyses and formal security verification of the scheme are performed, and the performance of the scheme is compared with existing UAV schemes. The above analyses show that our scheme has great advantages in terms of security and overheads.

Satellite communication has played an important part in many different industries because of its advantages of wide coverage, strong disaster tolerance and high flexibility. The security of satellite communication systems has always been the concern of many scholars. Without authentication, user should not obtain his/her required services. Beyond that, the anonymity also needs to be protected during communications. In this study, we design an efficient and provably secure key agreement scheme for satellite communication systems. In each session, we replace user’s true identity by a temporary identity, which will be updated for each session, to guarantee the anonymity. Because the only use of lightweight algorithms, our proposed scheme has high performance. Furthermore, the security of the proposed scheme is proved in the real-or-random model and the performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme is more efficient than some other schemes for satellite communication systems.