Antoni Rubí-Barceló

Dr. Antoni Rubí-Barceló

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 October 2020 in International Tax and Public Finance
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Journal Article
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DCDaniel Cardona
Daniel Cardona
JFJenny De Freitas
Jenny De Freitas
ARAntoni Rubí-Barceló
Antoni Rubí-Barceló

1 September 2016 in European Journal of Political Economy
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Journal Article
Closed access
DCDaniel Cardona
Daniel Cardona
ARAntoni Rubí-Barceló
Antoni Rubí-Barceló

23 June 2022 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DCDaniel Cardona
Daniel Cardona
JFJenny De Freitas
Jenny De Freitas
ARAntoni Rubí-Barceló
Antoni Rubí-Barceló
In lobbying competition to influence a policy ranging over a continuum, lottery and share contests can be regarded as two alternative conflict resolution protocols. In the lottery contest, the policy is selected probabilistically whereas in the share contest the policy choice is deterministic. Although these two contest settings are equivalent for risk‐neutral lobbyists, this equivalence fails to hold when they are risk‐averse. We demonstrate that when lobbyists have concave preferences over policies and select their policy proposals, they strategically moderate their claims only under the (probabilistic) lottery setting. This action defuses the conflict and reduces the exerted effort. Consequently, risk‐averse contestants might unanimously prefer the lottery to the share contest.

1 August 2017 in Games
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ARAntoni Rubí-Barceló
Antoni Rubí-Barceló
It has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large benefits to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The work in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) shows that the large payoff differentials caused by structural holes can persist even when agents strategically add and remove ties to smooth those differentials, thereby providing a game-theoretic rationale for the existence of bridge-agents. The present paper ties back to the initial empirical literature by explicitly assuming that agents are exogenously linked forming cliques, as in a firm environment. In this setting, bridge-agents cannot be sustained under the same conditions of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). Instead, they can be sustained when the deviation possibilities are restricted and only when they connect small groups of agents to the rest.

12 May 2016 in Games
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Journal Article
Open access
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DCDaniel Cardona
Daniel Cardona
ARAntoni Rubí-Barceló
Antoni Rubí-Barceló
We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members.