In the background of green and low-carbon development, many enterprises still have illegal emission behaviors to obtain excess revenue. Therefore, it is an urgent problem to restrain the illegal emission behaviors of enterprises through external supervision. This paper mainly studies the regulatory system composed of government and enterprises. We divide the regulation into two phases: loose regulation and strict regulation, analyzed the impact of government regulatory intensity on carbon emission behavior enterprises and industry market structure through the evolutionary game model. The results show that with the increase of the intensity of government supervision, leading enterprises will gradually complete the transformation and upgrading from low carbon to compliant production. The leading enterprises with low carbon technology have strengthened their dominant position in the market, while the enterprises without low carbon technology are constrained by carbon emissions and can only continue to stay in the industry market by buying carbon emission rights or exiting the market. The industry market structure gradually changed from a decentralized competition structure to a centralized oligopoly structure.

Ecological compensation is an important means of basin pollution control, the existing researches mainly focus on the government level ignoring the important role of enterprises. Therefore, this paper introduces enterprises into the process of ecological compensation. Firstly, suppose the ecological compensation system composed of government and enterprises, the government is in the dominant position. The ecological compensation input of the government and enterprise will produce social reputation, and the ecological compensation of enterprise will also produce advertising effect. Consumer demand will be affected by social reputation and advertising effect. Then, the compensation strategies of the government and enterprise are analyzed by constructing the differential game model. The research shows that under certain conditions, the cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of the benefits of government, enterprise and the whole system. Under the cooperative mechanism, the benefit of the government, enterprise and the whole system is optimal. Finally, the validity of the conclusion is verified by case analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the relevant parameters is carried out. The conclusion can provide reference for government to establish sustainable watershed ecological compensation mechanism.

In the context of green development, cooperation between government and enterprises in emission reduction is an effective way to improve the efficiency of enterprise emission reduction. In carbon trading policies, this paper assumes that the consumer demand influenced by product green level and enterprise goodwill, considering the continuous production in a multiple cycle under the condition of dynamic change characteristics, constructs the government and enterprise cooperation to reduce emissions of three kinds of differential game model, to explore the effective way of government and enterprise cooperation. The results show that cost-sharing contracts can achieve Pareto improvement of revenue for the government, enterprise under a certain condition; the revenue of the government, enterprises, and systems are optimal under collaborative cooperation. Finally, we prove the validity of the conclusion through an example analysis, and the sensitivity of related parameters is analyzed.

Bank credit financing and trade credit financing are two basic ways for small- and medium-sized enterprises to solve financial difficulties. We studied a supply chain financing (SCF) system with one capital-constrained manufacturer and one capital-rich supplier, in which manufacturers can choose bank credit financing (BCF) or trade credit financing (TCF) to solve financial difficulties. Unlike the traditional SCF, we considered the influence of the carbon emission trading mechanism, and we designed BCF and TCF models and derived the equilibrium strategies of the supply chain members under a carbon-constrained environment. The research shows that the emission reduction level of manufacturers increases with the increase in carbon emission trading price, and the output of manufacturers increases with the increase in emission reduction level of manufacturers. When the manufacturers emission reduction level is low, the suppliers benefits under BCF are higher than those under TCF. There is a threshold for the manufacturers emission reduction level. When the emission reduction level is higher than this threshold, the manufacturer chooses BCF mode with higher benefits; on the contrary, TCF mode is more profitable.

Aiming at the problem that the government regulates the carbon emission of enterprises, this paper introduces the prospect theory to correct the revenue function of government and enterprise, considering the risk of air quality deterioration, built an evolutionary game model of government and enterprise based on prospect theory. According to the weight of the two sides on the probability of air quality deterioration under the equilibrium state, the risk of air quality deterioration is divided into three levels: low, medium and high. Analyzed the evolution strategy of government and enterprise under different levels. The results show that when the risk of air quality deterioration is low, the government tends to negative regulation and enterprises adopt traditional production. When the risk of air quality deterioration is high, government tend to be positive in regulation and enterprises are inclined to low-carbon production at the beginning. However, with the implementation of enterprises low-carbon production, government departments will turn to negative regulation. At the same time, there will be incentive paradox phenomenon in the process of government regulation of carbon emissions.In the long run, it is more effective to strengthen the punishment of government departments' ineffective supervision than to punish enterprises.