Purpose: Construction projects have become increasingly long, complex and costly with waste and inefficiencies and often fail to achieve the desired results. Integrated project delivery (IPD) is believed to change these problems. A reasonable and fair profit distribution mechanism is a critical factor for ensuring the success of the IPD projects. This study aims to investigate the strategies of all participants in the profit distribution of an IPD project with respect to the factor of the effort level.Design/methodology/approach: This study describes the influence of owners and participants on profit distribution due to their respective efforts in the IPD project alliance. The influence of effort level on profit distribution is discussed based on the Holmstrom-Milgrom model of asymmetric information game theory and principal-agent theory, combined with incentive compatibility (IC) constraints and individual rationality (IR) constraints.Findings: The results show that the optimal level of effort by each participant optimizes the profit distribution of an IPD project. At the same time, in the revenue incentive contract, the effort level of the participants is positively correlated with the profit distribution, proportional to their contribution coefficient and inversely proportional to the square of the cost of their creative activities in terms of effort. Each party of an IPD project can adopt a series of measures to improve their own effort level and choose the optimal level of effort based on the profit distribution, while satisfying their own utility maximization.Originality/value: This study introduces the Holmstrom-Milgrom model in the principal-agent theory to explore the influence of the effort level on profit distribution in IPD projects. The quantitative model can contribute to establish a fair and efficient profit distribution scheme for the IPD projects.

Purpose: This paper examines the profit distribution of engineering projects in the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode. IPD is a new delivery method that can ameliorate many of the disadvantages of traditional delivery methods and improve project results. In the implementation of IPD, the profit distribution is key for ensuring the success of IPD projects.Design/methodology/approach: This paper described a new method for characterizing profit distribution in the IPD mode. The payment function and Shapley value of the cooperative fuzzy game of fuzzy alliance were defined by considering the Choquet integral of the fuzzy measure. The participation of each player was considered, and the influence of participation on the profit distribution was discussed. Lastly, changes in the profit distribution of core participants under different alliance combinations were studied.Findings: A case from a report of The American Institute of Architects (AIA) was used to verify the fuzzy alliance model. There was a significant correlation between the degree of participation of the owner, architect and builder and the profit distribution among these three participants.Research limitations/implications: The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, this paper selects a case with only three key participants in order to simplify the research. When there are many core participants, how to establish the alliance in the IPD mode and how to establish the corresponding profit distribution model, further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities in models. Second, in this case, BIM technology has little impact on the income of the whole project. Therefore, this paper does not consider the impact of BIM technology on the marginal effect of the IPD project. Third, the contract type in the case is a custom tri-party based on IFOA. There is no classified discussion of the impact of different contracts on the profit distribute in the paper.Practical implications: Based on the in-depth study of cooperative game with alliance structure, this paper promotes the classic cooperative game with alliance structure. The authors define the payoff function of fuzzy cooperative games by Choquet integral of fuzzy measure, and introduce the idea into the field of IPD. It aims at extending the solution to a cooperative game without a core. It can be obtained through a simple calculation. In the IPD alliance, the fuzziness and uncertainty of the participation degree of each participant will affect the profit of the whole project. The authors find that the higher the participation rate of players, the more profit each participant has. The greater the influence weight of the designer on the alliance, the lower the influence weight of the contractor on the alliance, the lower the participation of the contractor and the designer, and the lower the income distribution value of the three core participants. It shows a monotonous decline status.Social implications: For any construction enterprise, it can make more profits if it joins the grand alliance. In the IPD alliance, each participant can maximize their own interests, which can also promote the enthusiasm of construction enterprises to participate in the alliance and increase the application of IPD mode in AEC industry. This research method provides a new fast, effective, and more realistic solution method for cooperative countermeasures. It can be further extended to other cooperative game fields and advance a new research perspective and solution for the distribution of cooperative interests.Originality/value: The contribution of this paper is the development of a fuzzy alliance model that provides a tool for measuring the profit distribution in IPD. This is the first quantitative model to connect the degree of participation with the profit distribution in IPD using fuzzy alliance.

Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) is regarded as an effective project delivery method that can deal with the challenge of the rapid development of the architecture, engineering, and construction (AEC) industry. In the IPD team, the alliance profit is not distributed fairly and effectively due to uncertainty, preventing the achievement of the IPD project goals. This study focuses on optimizing the profit distribution among stakeholders in IPD projects and uses quadratic programming models to solve fuzzy cooperative games in the IPD. A payoff function is used in the fuzzy alliance to determine the characteristics of the interval-valued fuzzy numbers, and different weights of the alliance and the efficiency of the player’s participation in the IPD are considered in the profit distribution. A case study is conducted, and the results of the proposed method are compared with those of crisp cooperative games. The results show that the fuzzy cooperative game increases the profit of participants in IPD projects. It is more practical to use weight fuzzy cooperative games than crisp games to express imputation. Moreover, the quadratic programming models and methods result in a fair and efficient profit distribution scheme in IPD projects.

Integrated project delivery (IPD) has gained significant attention as an effective alternative to traditional project delivery models. Profit distribution is a crucial aspect of IPD projects, influencing their overall success. This study aims to investigate the key factors impacting profit distribution to offer strategic guidance for project management practices. The study employs a comprehensive bibliometric analysis to establish an updated research framework in this domain. Through this analysis, 24 articles with highly relevant and extensively cited sources are identified for further examination. Grounded theory is subsequently applied to distill the findings. This process yields a foundational theoretical framework that delineates the factors influencing profit distribution in IPD projects, namely, contribution, resource-based input, effort level, and risk sharing. Additionally, a textual analysis of ten burst words is conducted to discern research trends and identify future areas of study. This research contributes to the existing literature by addressing gaps and providing a roadmap for future IPD investigations. A theoretical framework of influencing factors in profit distribution in IPD projects is developed based on the literature. The findings not only enhance understanding of profit distribution dynamics in IPD projects but also guide the implementation and optimization of IPD practices.

Small-diameter tunnels play a crucial role in urban infrastructure, managing functions such as sewage, rainwater, and electrical systems. However, the safety assessment of small-diameter tunnel shield construction faces difficulties due to unclear physical relationships and the limitations of traditional physical information models in predicting complex risks. To address this issue, the integration of physical information with data-driven analysis methods offers a promising approach. Combining these advantages, a hybrid model was proposed to establish a robust construction safety risk evaluation framework for small-diameter tunnels under geological conditions. The presently proposed method mainly consists of a clustering of risk factors, physical information stratification, and risk early warning. Specifically, the K-means clustering method optimized by the Harris Hawks algorithm was used for risk identification, the Analytic Hierarchy Process was used for risk analysis, and the physical information output from the risk analysis was used for risk warning. A case study was produced, utilizing the proposed hybrid model for the Wuhan East Lake Deep Tunnel project. The results show the risk transfer path through inadequate personnel safety awareness and protection, mechanical system failures and installation deviations, substandard material quality and improper stacking, outdated or immature construction technology, and environmental risks.