Global efforts for biodiversity protection and land use-based greenhouse gas mitigation call for increases in the effectiveness and efficiency of environmental conservation. Incentive-based policy instruments are key tools for meeting these goals, yet their effectiveness might be undermined by such factors as social norms regarding whether payments are considered fair. We investigated the causal link between equity and conservation effort with a randomized real-effort experiment in forest conservation with 443 land users near a tropical forest national park in the Vietnamese Central Annamites, a global biodiversity hotspot. The experiment introduced unjustified payment inequality based on luck, in contradiction of local fairness norms that were measured through responses to vignettes. Payment inequality was perceived as less fair than payment equality. In agreement with our preregistered hypotheses, participants who were disadvantaged by unequal payments exerted significantly less conservation effort than other participants receiving the same payment under an equal distribution. No effect was observed for participants advantaged by inequality. Thus, equity effects on effort can have consequences for the effectiveness and efficiency of incentive-based conservation instruments. Furthermore, we show that women exerted substantially more conservation effort than men, and that increasing payment size unexpectedly reduced effort. This emphasizes the need to consider social comparisons, local equity norms, and gender in environmental policies using monetary incentives to motivate behavioral change.
This paper studies a key element of discrimination, namely, when stereotypes translate into discriminatory actions. Using a hiring experiment, we rule out taste-based discrimination by design and test for the presence of two types of belief-based gender discrimination. We document evidence of explicit discriminators—individuals who are willing to discriminate even when their hiring choices are highly revealing of their gender-biased beliefs. Crucially, we also identify implicit discriminators—individuals who do not discriminate against women when taking a discriminatory action is highly revealing of their biased beliefs, but do discriminate against women when their biased motive is obscured. Our analysis highlights the central role played by features of the choice environment in determining whether and how discrimination will manifest. We conclude by discussing the implications for policy design. This paper was accepted by Marie Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: K. Barron and S. Schweighofer-Kodritsch gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC TRR 190 [Grant 280092119]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01229 .
Population declines in shark species have been reported on local and global scales, with overfishing, habitat destruction and climate change posing severe threats. The lack of species‐specific baseline data on ecology and distribution of many sharks, however, makes conservation measures challenging. Here, we present a fisheries‐independent shark survey from the Fiji Islands, where scientific knowledge on locally occurring elasmobranchs is largely still lacking despite the location's role as a shark hotspot in the Pacific. Juvenile shark abundance in the fishing grounds of the Ba Estuary (north‐western Viti Levu) was assessed with a gillnet‐ and longline‐based survey from December 2015 to April 2016. A total of 103 juvenile sharks identified as blacktip Carcharhinus limbatus (n = 57), scalloped hammerhead Sphyrna lewini (n = 35), and great hammerhead Sphyrna mokarran (n = 11) sharks were captured, tagged, and released. The condition of umbilical scars (68% open or semihealed), mean sizes of individuals (±SD) (C. limbatus: 66.5 ± 3.8 cm, S. lewini: 51.8 ± 4.8 cm, S. mokarran 77.4 ± 2.8 cm), and the presence of these species over recent years (based on fishermen interviews), suggest that the Ba Estuary area is a critical habitat for multiple species that are classified as “Near Threatened” or “Endangered.” Specifically, the area likely acts as a parturition ground over the studied period, and potentially as a subsequent nursery area. We identified subareas of high abundance and found that temperature, salinity and depth acted as small‐scale environmental drivers of shark abundance. The data suggests a tendency for species‐specific spatial use, both horizontally (i.e., between sampling areas) and vertically (i.e., across the water column). These results enhance the understanding of shark ecology in Fiji and provide a scientific basis for the implementation of local conservation strategies that contribute to the protection of these threatened species.
Collective action of resource users is essential for sustainability. Yet, often user groups are socioculturally heterogeneous, which requires cooperation to be established across salient group boundaries. We explore the effect of this type of heterogeneity on resource extraction in lab-in-the-field Common Pool Resource (CPR) experiments in Zanzibar, Tanzania. We create heterogeneous groups by mixing fishers from two neighbouring fishing villages which have distinct social identities, a history of conflict and diverging resource use practices and institutions. Additionally, we analyse between-village differences in extraction behaviour in the heterogeneous setting to assess if out-group cooperation in a CPR dilemma is associated with a community’s institutional scope in the economic realm (e.g., degree of market integration). We find no aggregate effect of heterogeneity on extraction. However, this is because fishers from the two villages behave differently in the heterogeneity treatment. We find support for the hypothesis that cooperation under sociocultural heterogeneity is higher for fishers from the village with larger institutional scope. In line with this explanation, cooperation under heterogeneity also correlates with a survey measure of individual fishers’ radius of trust. We discuss implications for resource governance and collective action research.