Floyd Johnson

Mr. Floyd Johnson

Florida Atlantic University, FL 33314, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
25 March 2021 in Entropy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CGCARLOS EDUARDO GONZALEZ GUILLEN
CARLOS EDUARDO GONZALEZ GUILLEN
María Isabel González VascoMaría Isabel González Vasco
María Isabel González Vasco
FJFloyd Johnson
Floyd Johnson
APAngel Luis Perez Del Pozo
Angel Luis Perez Del Pozo
Identification schemes are interactive cryptographic protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of their identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decides whether or not it comes from the intended prover. Given the growing interest in quantum computation, it is indeed desirable to have explicit designs for achieving user identification through quantum resources. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki. We discuss the applicability of the theoretical impossibility results from Lo, Colbeck and Buhrman et al. and formally prove that the protocol must necessarily be insecure. Moreover, to better illustrate our insecurity claim, we present an attack on Zawadzki’s protocol and show that by using a simple strategy an adversary may indeed obtain relevant information on the shared identification secret. Specifically, through the use of the principal of conclusive exclusion on quantum measurements, our attack geometrically reduces the key space resulting in the claimed logarithmic security being reduced effectively by a factor of two after only three verification attempts.

18 December 2023
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
SBShi Bai
Shi Bai
MHMaya-Iggy van Hoof
Maya-Iggy van Hoof
FJFloyd Johnson
Floyd Johnson
TLTanja Lange
Tanja Lange
TNTran Ngo
Tran Ngo

29 November 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
SBShi Bai
Shi Bai
ABAustin Beard
Austin Beard
FJFloyd Johnson
Floyd Johnson
SVSulani K. B. Vidhanalage
Sulani K. B. Vidhanalage
TNTran Ngo
Tran Ngo

30 March 2020 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
CGCARLOS EDUARDO GONZALEZ GUILLEN
CARLOS EDUARDO GONZALEZ GUILLEN
María Isabel González VascoMaría Isabel González Vasco
María Isabel González Vasco
FJFloyd Johnson
Floyd Johnson
APAngel Luis Perez Del Pozo
Angel Luis Perez Del Pozo
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).