The undertaking of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a topic of widespread concern in society. Utilising a sample of 9872 private‐holding companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen securities markets from 2009 to 2019, this study examines the impact of state‐owned capital on CSR activities. We find that CSR is enhanced when the proportion of state‐owned capital in a private‐holding listed company exceeds 5 percent. The appointment of directors, supervisors, and senior management by state‐owned shareholders, and the participation of state‐owned investment in company operation further promote the fulfilment of CSR in private‐holding listed companies. This research not only enriches the literature on the economic consequences of state‐owned equity holdings in private companies, but also provides empirical evidence regarding the outcomes of improvement of corporate governance mechanisms.

This paper examines the issue of earning management in companies with equity incentives from two dimensions: management manipulation of the intensity of R&D and accounting treatment by using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies in China from 2014 to 2019. We find that in order to depress the benchmarks and exercise prices for the performance appraisal of the equity incentive covenants, managers not only conduct accrual earnings management by expensing R&D expenditure but also increase the intensity of R&D investment for real earnings management. We also find that companies with equity incentives where managers have more power are more inclined to opt for the more concealed means of real earnings management and try to avoid accrual earnings management, which may entail higher regulatory costs and greater litigation risk with tightening accounting regulations. Our findings contribute to expanding the literature on earnings management of companies with equity incentives and provide empirical evidence for regulators to implement ‘precision regulation’ on equity incentives and earnings management.

This paper examines the effect of the prior audit experience of chief financial officers (CFOs) on corporate information disclosure. Utilising a sample of 25,480 firm‐annual observations of A‐share Chinese listed companies over the period 2007–2019, we find that CFOs with audit experience improve the quality of corporate information disclosure. We also find that Big 4 auditor CFOs have a more positive influence on corporate information. Finally, we find that the power of CEOs influences the effect of CFOs’ audit experience on corporate disclosure quality. This study contributes to the selection of CFOs by listed companies with the aim to improve corporate governance mechanisms.

The Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section is an important component of a company's annual report, where the management team provides a textual analysis of the company's performance for investors. Due to the existence of agency problems, management is likely to mask any earnings manipulation in order to maximise their salary, build a corporate empire or obtain more financing, which will reduce the reliability of the company's financial information. Utilising 13,679 Chinese A‐share listed companies from 2008 to 2020, this study examines the correlation between management earnings manipulation and annual report MD&A similarity. We find that earnings manipulation leads to increased MD&A similarity in order to reduce the transmission of useful information and thus stymie investors. As such, we recommend that regulatory authorities should monitor the level of similarity and validity of MD&A disclosures in addition to the authenticity of numerical financial information.