Industry 4.0 and, in particular, Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) represent two of the major automation and data exchange trends of the 21^st century, driving a steady increase in the number of smart embedded devices used by industrial applications. However, IoT devices suffer from numerous security flaws, resulting in a number of large scale cyber-attacks. In this light, Fog computing, a relatively new paradigm born from the necessity of bridging the gap between Cloud computing and IoT, can be used as a security solution for the IIoT. To achieve this, the first step is to clearly identify the security requirements of the IIoT that can be subsequently used to design security solutions based on Fog computing. With this in mind, our paper represents a preliminary work towards a systematic literature review of IIoT security requirements. We focus on two key steps of the review: (1) the research method that will be used in the systematic work and (2) a quantitative analysis of the results produced by the study selection process. This lays the necessary foundations to enable the use of Fog computing as a security solution for the IIoT.

In recent years, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol has enjoyed rapid growth as a security protocol for the Internet of Things (IoT). In its newest iteration, TLS 1.3, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has standardized a zero round-trip time (0-RTT) session resumption sub-protocol, allowing clients to already transmit application data in their first message to the server, provided they have shared session resumption details in a previous handshake. Since it is common for IoT devices to transmit periodic messages to a server, this 0-RTT protocol can help in reducing bandwidth overhead. Unfortunately, the sub-protocol has been designed for the Web and is susceptible to replay attacks. In our previous work, we adapted the 0-RTT protocol to strengthen it against replay attacks, while also reducing bandwidth overhead, thus making it more suitable for IoT applications. However, we did not include a formal security analysis of the protocol. In this work, we address this and provide a formal security analysis using OFMC. Further, we have included more accurate estimates on its performance, as well as making minor adjustments to the protocol itself to reduce implementation ambiguity and improve resilience.